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BETWEEN COSMOPOLIS AND COMMUNITY: THE
EMERGING BASIS FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE
FRANK J. GARCIA*
“Ubi societas, ibi ius.”1
“Our post-war institutions were built for an inter-national
world, but we now live in a global world.”2
“[T]here is nothing unjust about international inequalities
as such. Such inequalities are a natural feature of a world
in which more-or-less independent political communities
pursue the aims and purposes of their members, including
local conceptions of distributive justice.”3
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 R
II. GLOBALIZATION: THE GAME CHANGER . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 R
A. Globalization and the Global Circumstances of
Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 R
1. Capacity to Help . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 R
2. Capacity to Harm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 R
* Professor and Associate Dean for Global Initiatives, Boston College
Law School. The author thanks Lindita Ciko and Kirrin Hough for research
assistance; Paulo Barrozo, Jim Henle, Vlad Perju and Katie Young for key
insights; and as always Kim.
1. “Where there is society, there are laws.” Variously attributed to Cic-
ero, Ulpian, Hugo Grotius, or Baron Heinrich von Cocceji. The phrase de-
rives from a philosophical argument, inspired by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Eth-
ics, usually summarized as follows:
Ubi homo, ibi societas.  Ubi societas, ibi ius.
Ergo: ubi homo, ibi ius.
(Where the human being is, there is a society.
Where there is a society, there is law.
Therefore: where the human being is, there is law.)
David Heath-Stade, Ubi societas, ibi ius, DAVID HEATH-STADE’S BLOG (June 2,
2012, 10:07 AM), http://davidheithstade.wordpress.com/2012/06/02/ubi-
societas-ibi-ius/.
2. KOFI ANNAN, WE THE PEOPLES: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN
THE 21ST CENTURY 11 (2000).
3. David Miller, Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice, in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY:
DIVERSE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 164, 179 (David Mapel & Terry Nardin, eds.,
1998).
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Markets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 R
2. Shared Understandings, Meta-State
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I. INTRODUCTION
Globalization is fundamentally transforming economic
and social relations, but its impact has yet to be fully realized
in jurisprudence and political theory. Accepting for the mo-
ment Aristotle’s contention that for justice to be possible,
there has to be that minimum level of mutual institutionalized
relationship he refers to as “having a share in the constitu-
tion,”4 the relevant question is whether we see such relation-
4. “Of particular justice and that which is just in the corresponding
sense, one kind is that which is manifested in distributions of honour or
money or the other things that fall to be divided among those who have a
share in the constitution.” ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. V, ch. 2 at
84 (David Ross trans., Oxford University Press 2009) (c. 384 B.C.). Thomas
Nagel has characterized this approach as the “political conception” of jus-
tice. Thomas Nagel, The Problem of Global Justice, PHIL. & PUB. AFF. Spring
2005, at 113, 113–29. By this he means a conception of justice that does not
flow from a comprehensive prior system of morality (as with cosmopolitan-
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2013] BETWEEN COSMOPOLIS AND COMMUNITY 3
ships emerging beyond our national borders. In Aristotle’s
time, the conditions he set for justice (allocation of social
goods and this “share in the constitution”) were met only
within a polis, or polity, and not across polities. The world has
changed remarkably since then, and the single word best cap-
turing the essence of that change is globalization.
Each of the dimensions of globalization discussed in the
literature (inter-connectedness,5 economic de-regulation,6 in-
ism), but rather is rooted in social relations and social institutions—in Rawls’
famous phrase, justice as “the first virtue of social institutions.” JOHN RAWLS,
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8 (1979). On this view, sovereign states are “precisely
what give[ ] the value of justice its application, by putting the fellow citizens
of a sovereign state into a relation that they do not have with the rest of
humanity, an institutional relation which must then be evaluated by the spe-
cial standards of fairness and equality that fill out the content of justice.”
Nagel, supra, at 120. This view poses special challenges to the possibility of
global justice, which this Article addresses.
5. We can readily see how what happens in one country now affects
others to an unprecedented degree, in matters ranging from financial mar-
kets to tastes in fashion and entertainment to political change and civil un-
rest. See, e.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECO-
NOMICS AND CULTURE 15 (1999) (“[T]he growing extensity, intensity and veloc-
ity of global interactions may also be associated with a deepening
enmeshment of the local and global such that the impact of distant events is
magnified while even the most local developments may come to have enor-
mous global consequences. In this sense, the boundaries between domestic
matters and global affairs may be blurred.”). See generally Robert O. Keohane
& Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence in the Information Age, FOREIGN
AFF., Sept.–Oct. 1998, at 81–94 (defining globalization in terms of unprece-
dented degrees of interdependence). This transnationalization is also re-
flected in the increasing number of cross-border networks formed by non-
State actors such as corporations, civic associations, scientific bodies, and in-
dividuals. See generally Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb.
1997, at 50, 50–51 (1997) (cataloguing the rise of non-State actors facilitated
by telecommunications technology).
6. There is broad consensus that economic de-regulation is one of the
principal engines of globalization, though commentators differ widely in
their evaluation of the consequences of this fact. The resulting increase in
the number of transactions involving goods, services, labor, and capital cross-
ing national boundaries promotes a degree of economic interconnectedness
resembling, at least to some commentators, a single market spanning the
globe. See, e.g., PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: TRANSFORMING THE WORLD
ECONOMY (3d ed. 1998) (documenting the shift to a global pattern of pro-
duction). But see PAUL Q. HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON, GLOBALIZATION IN
QUESTION  (2d ed. 1999) (arguing that an increasingly interconnected inter-
state economy is not synonymous with a global economy).
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4 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 46:1
ternationalization7 and homogenization,8 to name only the
most salient) contributes to an understanding of how global-
ization is changing social relations.9 However, it is the essence
7. Internationalization describes the shift in power from States to inter-
national systems and institutions. See Franz Nuscheler, Global Governance, De-
velopment, and Peace, in GLOBAL TRENDS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 156, 157
(Paul Kennedy, Dirk Messner & Franz Nuscheler, eds., 2002) (noting that
interdependence in a global system narrows the scope of action open to gov-
ernments). This can also be called regulatory globalization, emphasizing the
regulation of markets for goods, labor, capital, and services at new levels that
require formalized inter-state cooperation through new and powerful insti-
tutions like the WTO, and that may, in certain cases, transcend nation-state
control to a significant degree, as with the European Union. See Alfred C.
Aman, The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: From
Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379, 379 (2001) (em-
phasizing change in dynamics of law formation wrought by globalization); see
also Jost Delbruck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets—Implications for
Domestic Law—A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10–11,
17 (1993) (illustrating globalization as signifying changes in the locus of reg-
ulation). This aspect of globalization often leads to complaints about global-
ization as insufficiently democratic, due to the imperfect nature of these in-
stitutions from a democratic theory point of view. See infra note 160 and
accompanying text (discussing the problem of voice in current transnational
governance).
8. Globalization is often characterized as homogenization, the unifica-
tion or harmonization of cultural forms. See Jan Aart Scholte, What is ‘Global’
about Globalization?, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 84, 84 (David Held & Andrew G. Mc-
Grew eds., 2d ed. 2003). Commentators worry that shared patterns of con-
sumption worldwide tend to break down distinctive cultures and contribute
to a collective identity based on that consumption. See Kevin Robins, Encoun-
tering Globalization, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra at 239,
241; Richard Barnet & John Cavanagh, Homogenization of Global Culture, in
THE CASE AGAINST THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AND FOR A TURN TOWARD LOCALIZA-
TION 73 (Jerry Mander & Edward Goldsmith eds., 1996). In this view, con-
sumption of products and brands like McDonalds, Coca Cola, and Levi’s
(and the implicit ratification of the cultural values that such products and
brands signify) is a mode of self-expression, and their ubiquity leads to
global cultural homogeneity. But see Jon Mandle, Globalization and Justice, 570
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 126, 136–37 (2000) [hereinafter Global-
ization and Justice] (showing how globalization accelerates pace of global cul-
tural change, but not necessarily in a homogeneous manner); John Tomlin-
son, Globalization and Cultural Identity, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER, supra, at 269, 271 (showing globalization as a significant force in
creating and proliferating cultural identity, not destroying it).
9. For a thoughtful recent survey of this rich literature, see generally
GLOBALIZATION: CAUSES AND EFFECTS (David Deese ed., 2012).
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2013] BETWEEN COSMOPOLIS AND COMMUNITY 5
of globalization—the compression of space10—that underlies
the transformative impact of globalization on both global so-
cial relations and the possibility of global justice. This com-
pression intensifies social relations regardless of territorial
boundaries and, indeed, transcends territory itself.11 Through
globalization, we are interconnected irrespective of time and
space, to a degree never before seen in human history.12
Such compression does more than simply facilitate inter-
national business, networking, and information sharing: It
changes the way space enters into social relationships, with
consequent changes at all levels of human experience. Most
fundamentally, globalization intensifies our awareness of the
world as a whole. Geographic constraints on social and cul-
tural arrangements recede, and people become increasingly
aware they are receding. In real terms, boundaries become
10. The paradigmatic definition of globalization, drawn from political
geography and sociology, asserts that among all the many definitions of
globalization there is one common element: a fundamental change in the
spatial dimensions of human interaction. Scholte, supra note 8; Jay R. Man-
dle & Louis Ferleger, Dimensions of Globalization, Preface, 570 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 8, 8 (2000). See generally DAVID HARVEY, THE CONDI-
TION OF POSTMODERNITY: AN ENQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL
CHANGE (1990) (arguing that changes in technology have changed capital
flow, politics, and culture).
11. This compression of space “deterritorializes” social relations, taking
them out of the bounded territory of the nation-state and stretching them
across the globe, allowing ideas, information, capital, goods, pathogens,
power, and criminality to cross boundaries at unprecedented rates. On the
many contemporary pressures on boundaries and our notion of them, see
generally David Miller & Sohail Hashmi, Introduction, in BOUNDARIES AND JUS-
TICE (David Miller & Sohail Hashmi eds., 2001) (discussing boundaries be-
tween peoples and how they are being broken down).
12. Earlier waves of transnationalization had been driven by technologies
such as the telegraph, which reduced space but did not virtually eliminate it.
In contrast, contemporary globalization is characterized by networked global
communications, in which satellites and the Internet effectively eliminate
space, or dramatically compress it into a single shared space. See A.G. Hop-
kins, The History of Globalization—and the Globalization of History?, in GLOBAL-
IZATION IN WORLD HISTORY 12, 20 (A.G. Hopkins ed. 2002) (noting that the
internet is not simply a new, faster telegraph, but a new kind of technology
that effectively shrinks space); Scholte, supra note 8, at 86; Mandle &
Ferleger, supra note 10, at 8. By speaking in the aggregate and saying “we”
are interconnected I do not mean to ignore the marginalizing effects of
globalization, but only to highlight the collective shift. On the former, see
GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE 31 (UNDP 1999) (noting disparate im-
pact of globalization’s time-space compressions).
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6 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 46:1
more porous—we know more about what happens beyond our
boundaries, we travel more easily beyond our boundaries, our
actions affect others beyond our boundaries in more pro-
nounced ways, we are aware of these effects, and we have new
and more profound opportunities to engage in commerce be-
yond our boundaries.
This phenomenon has a whole range of social, economic,
political, legal, and cultural effects, widely catalogued and
widely (and justly) debated.13 In this Article I am focusing on
globalization’s effects on justice theory, specifically on the na-
ture and possibility of global justice.14 Some theorists see in
globalization evidence of an emerging global society, fulfilling
cosmopolitan principles15 and involving global social coopera-
13. See, e.g., THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 8 (gather-
ing a variety of views regarding the phenomenon of globalization).
14. See AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 173 n.* (2009) (“The recent
transformation of the world into a much smaller place, thanks to innovations
in communications and transport, and the ongoing development of global
media and transnational organizations, have made it hard not to take note
of our extensive connections across the world, which have profound implica-
tions not only for the form and content of a theory of justice . . . but also for
global politics—and indeed survival.”).
15. Cosmopolitanism is derived from the Greek word kosmopolites, a cit-
izen of the world, “familiar with, and at ease in many different countries and
cultures . . . .” See Cosmopolitan Definition, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(2013), http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/
cosmopolitan?q=cosmopolitan (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). Thus, the etymol-
ogy of the word reveals its meaning: Cosmopolitanism characterizes a family
of views relying on the idea that all human beings are essentially equal and
therefore constitute a single world community. Thomas Pogge, Cosmopolitan-
ism, in A COMPANION TO CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 312, 312
(Robert E. Goodin, Philip Pettit & Thomas Pogge eds., 2d ed. 2007). There
are two main strands of cosmopolitanism—moral and political (also called
legal or institutional). Id. at 312–29; see also Pauline Kleingeld & Eric Brown,
Cosmopolitanism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (2006),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/cosmopolitanism/ (last visited Oct. 1,
2013). Moral cosmopolitanism concerns itself with human equality across
national political boundaries, and our resulting individual duties to others,
to be realized through existing institutional structures. Charles Beitz, Social
and Cosmopolitan Liberalism, 75 INT’L AFF. 515, 515–29 (1999). Political cos-
mopolitanism concerns itself with the implications of moral cosmopolitan-
ism for the nature of institutions, and generally includes calls for institu-
tional reform along cosmopolitan lines and even the creation of new global
institutions. From the point of view of a cosmopolitan, global justice is not a
problem. We owe all human beings justice in our social relations, simply
because they are human beings. For this reason, many of the most ambitious
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2013] BETWEEN COSMOPOLIS AND COMMUNITY 7
tion around an emerging normative priority for the individual
through human rights.16 Nevertheless, cosmopolitans are
often criticized by communitarians17 and others for their
moral psychology: failing to take into account how human be-
ings actually form their identities and moral commitments
(within specific communities),18 and failing to take into ac-
and elegant arguments for global justice at the institutional level are cosmo-
politan in nature, for example, in the work of Simon Caney, and stretching
all the way back to Kant himself (though Kant refrained from what for most
political cosmopolitans is the ultimate step—world government). SIMON CA-
NEY, JUSTICE BEYOND BORDERS: A GLOBAL POLITICAL THEORY 2–4 (2005). See
generally IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAY (Mary
Campbell Smith trans., Motley Press 1903) (1795).
16. See, e.g., CANEY, supra note 15 (laying out a defense of cosmopolitan-
ism); GILLIAN BROCK, GLOBAL JUSTICE: A COSMOPOLITAN ACCOUNT 45–83
(2009) (developing a cosmopolitan account of global justice); DAVID KINLEY,
CIVILISING GLOBALISATION (2009) (attempting to define the relationship be-
tween globalization and human rights); Anthony McGrew, A Global Society?,
in MODERNITY AND ITS FUTURES 61–116 (Stewart Hall et al. eds., 1992) (dis-
cussing the developments of the late twentieth century as moving toward a
more global society).
17. Communitarianism in its contemporary form emerged in the 1980s
as a critical response to the liberal theory of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice.
While communitarian theory does not present a systematic alternative to lib-
eralism, several main critiques have developed in response to Rawls’s de-
emphasis on the community and his limited view of government’s role in
society. See Daniel Bell, Communitarianism, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY (2012) http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2012/ent
ries/communitarianism/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2013). One such critique dis-
putes Rawls’s universalist view of justice and instead posits that standards of
justice are dependent on the interpretative framework within which individ-
uals view their world. SEYLA BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMU-
NITY, AND POSTMODERNISM IN CONTEMPORARY ETHICS 23–38 (1992) (discuss-
ing the inconsistencies of universalism); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUS-
TICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 1–11 (1988). Several prominent communitarian
theorists perceive the political community, and ultimately the nation-state, as
necessary for shaping the limits of justice. See David Miller, The Ethical Signifi-
cance of Nationality, 98 ETHICS 647, 648 (1988) [hereinafter Ethical Significance
of Nationality]; MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURAL-
ISM AND EQUALITY 82–83 (1983) [hereinafter SPHERES OF JUSTICE]. A second
critique argues that the individualistic conception of the self under Rawlsian
liberalism fails to recognize the important relationship between the commu-
nity and the individual, and the inherent role of the community in defining
one’s identity. See MICHAEL SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE
55–59 (1982); CHARLES TAYLOR, PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES: PHIL-
OSOPHICAL PAPERS (1985).
18. Cosmopolitanism can be criticized as simply the global projection of
liberal values in an imagined solidarity, which fails to properly account for
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8 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 46:1
count the normative implications of this process, i.e., the
moral priority of local or national communities over thinner,
more abstract notions of transboundary identity or relation-
ship.19
For such communitarian critics, even global society would
not be sufficient, since they pose an even more stringent test:
what about global community? Communitarians argue that
one’s community (usually identified politically with the nation,
and generally expressed in terms of shared traditions, prac-
tices, and understandings20) is essentially tied to one’s identity,
integral to one’s flourishing, and constitutive of the very con-
cept of justice itself, and to whom we owe it.
For communitarians the limits of political community
form the limits of justice, and the apex political community is
the nation-state.21 The nation-state is the necessary basis for
certain key realities about how people reason morally and act politically. See,
e.g., Sebastiano Maffetone, Global Justice: Between Leviathan and Cosmopolis, 3
GLOBAL POLICY 443, 443 (2012) [hereinafter Global Justice] (characterizing
the cosmopolitan vision as “excessively blind to the role of shared social and
political institutions”). As Gillian Brock—herself a cosmopolitan—puts it,
moral cosmopolitanism “highlights the responsibilities we have to those we do
not know and with whom we are not intimate, but whose lives should be of con-
cern to us.” BROCK, supra note 16, at 9 (emphasis added). Maffetone, himself
a liberal but not a cosmopolitan, puts it thus: “When cosmopolitans leave the
safety of [a] domestic basic structure, they project themselves into another
political situation [in which] we cannot take for granted that our vision of
what is reasonable and comprehensive is widely shared.” Global Justice, supra,
at 451.
19. See DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 65–69 (2d ed., 2002) (discussing
the variation of relationships and to whom a duty is owed based upon type
and closeness of the relationship); SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 17.
20. Communitarian theorists differ on the precise nature of these neces-
sary relations, and in general this aspect of communitarianism is under-theo-
rized. Allen Buchanan, Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism, 99
ETHICS 852, 867 (1989).
21. The key lies in the concept of nationality, a subjective concept of
identity consisting of the shared beliefs of a set of people: that each belongs
with the other; that the association is neither transitory nor instrumental,
but rooted in a long shared history of living together that (one expects) will
continue into the future; and a sense of loyalty adequate to justify sacrificing
individual interests for the group. Ethical Significance of Nationality, supra note
17, at 648. To these subjective elements, Miller adds a requirement that a
nation should enjoy “some degree of political autonomy,” distinguishing it
from a mere ethnic group and moving it closer to that of a “people” under
international law and political theory, with some right of self-determination
not necessarily involving full Statehood. Id. In On Nationality, Miller joins the
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2013] BETWEEN COSMOPOLIS AND COMMUNITY 9
the solidarity or sense of the common good (in Michael
Walzer’s terms) necessary to support the individual sacrifices
which justice demands.22 Moreover, it is only within particular
communities that you can determine what justice consists of,
and who owes it to whom.23 As Walzer puts it, justice as a for-
mal concept requires that a society’s “substantive life is lived in
a certain way—that is, in a way faithful to the shared under-
standings of its members.”24 In other words, justice requires a
shared understanding of social goods. Only political commu-
nities have such shared understandings, and the pre-eminent
example is the nation-state.25 It is only within nations that jus-
tice makes sense, and it is only within nations that justice is
necessary, indeed, even possible.
Given these limits, what kinds of norms then apply be-
tween national communities?  Communitarians do recognize
what many commentators point out: that international rela-
tions today include many regimes that can be characterized as
cooperative associations for mutual self-interest, creating the
concept of nation as ethical community with a notion of self-determination,
bringing the idea of “nation” closer to Rawls’s notion of a “people”—an in-
teresting resonance. MILLER, supra note 19, at 11.
22. MILLER, supra note 19, at 90–96; see also CHARLES JONES, GLOBAL JUS-
TICE: DEFENDING COSMOPOLITANISM 157–58 (2001) (noting the connection
that Miller draws between nationality and solidarity). In a similar sense,
Walzer argues that a shared notion of the common good is necessary for the
sacrifices of justice, since almost by definition justice will be invoked when
someone has failed, or perceives herself as having failed, to secure her indi-
vidual self-interest. SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 82–83. This suggests
the larger argument that the communitarian sort of ethical particularism is
simply more accurate in capturing how we actually reason morally than the
universalist attempt at disembodied rationality. See BRIAN LEE CROWLEY, THE
SELF, THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY, at v (1987) (“. . . liberalism can
only achieve its goal of creating a rational world by turning men [sic] into
one-dimensional beings.”). Thus, underlying the debate about global justice
is a disagreement about the proper way to reason about moral obligations,
particularly or universally. See SANDEL, supra note 17, at 54–59.
23. For Miller, it is only within national communities that you can deter-
mine which people are to have their needs considered and the necessary
consensus over what counts as “need,” since these are social and not deter-
mined facts. Ethical Significance of Nationality, supra note 17, at 661.
24. SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 313.
25. See MILLER, supra note 19, at 68–73 (noting that it is the shared public
culture which defines individual and social goods, and only in the nation-
state is that public culture united with the rights, obligations and structures
of political cooperation through citizenship and statehood).
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10 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 46:1
possibility of agreed rules or norms (such as international law
itself).26 However, while undeniably important to interna-
tional relations, such forms of cooperation do not in their view
rise to the level of community, and therefore do not generate
justice obligations. In David Miller’s words:
[A]lthough in the contemporary world there are
clearly forms of interaction and cooperation occur-
ring at the global level—the international economy
provides the most obvious examples, but there are
also many forms of political cooperation, ranging
from defence treaties through to environmental pro-
tection agreements—these are not sufficient to constitute
a global community. They do not by themselves create
either a shared sense of identity or a common ethos.
And above all there is no common institutional struc-
ture that would justify us in describing unequal out-
comes as forms of unequal treatment.27
Accordingly, this conception of justice offers a specific
kind of challenge to the possibility of global justice; namely,
that global justice requires a kind of global relationship—
Nagel calls it sovereignty;28 others call it society or commu-
nity29—that we simply do not have, and perhaps cannot have
at the level of global interaction. But that is precisely where
globalization must be considered.
In this Article, I argue that globalization is creating new
normative possibilities for international relations by develop-
26. Leading examples include the WTO and Bretton Woods institutions
and, regionally, the European Union. See JONES, supra note 22, at 8 (listing
international institutions increasingly affecting people’s life prospects); Al-
len Buchanan, Rawls’s Law of Peoples: Rule for a Vanished Westphalian World,
110 ETHICS 697, 705–06 (2000) [hereinafter Westphalian World] (discussing
the “global basic structure” that includes these institutions).
27. David Miller, Justice and Global Inequality, in INEQUALITY, GLOBALIZA-
TION, AND WORLD POLITICS 190 (Andrew Hurrell & Ngaire Woods eds., 1999)
(emphasis added).
28. Nagel, supra note 4, at 114. This argument depends on the “nonexis-
tence” of a global basic structure, which this Article challenges. See also Global
Justice, supra note 18, at 446 (explaining Nagel’s view).
29. Mathias Risse subsumes both within his category of “relationalist” ap-
proaches to global justice. MATHIAS RISSE, ON GLOBAL JUSTICE 7–10 (2012).
Whether the necessary relationship is “society” or “community” is not as cen-
tral as their shared emphasis on the necessity of a specific kind of relation-
ship for justice to apply.
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2013] BETWEEN COSMOPOLIS AND COMMUNITY 11
ing the social basis for a truly “global” justice, thereby tran-
scending the objections most commonly raised by con-
tractarian30 and communitarian critics of global justice. This is
so because globalization is creating, facilitating, and contribut-
ing to the sorts of relationships which communitarians and
others cite as necessary for justice, but at a new, transboundary
level. As globalization reduces or eliminates the role of time
and space in many kinds of interactions, we see emerging the
sorts of shared understandings, practices, and traditions capa-
ble of supporting obligations of justice at a global level. Mem-
bers of this global web of relationships are increasingly aware
of each other’s needs and circumstances, increasingly capable
of effectively addressing these needs, and increasingly contrib-
uting to these circumstances in the first place. They find them-
selves involved in the same global market society, and together
they look to the same organizations, especially those at the
meta-state level, to provide regulatory approaches to problems
of global social policy. I argue that these developments are
constituting community with respect to different issues, institu-
tions, and sets of social relations within the global social space.
I am not arguing, however, that at this point in our history
global social relations constitute the sort of full-blown political
community that communitarians find in domestic social rela-
tions, or that cosmopolitans posit in their compelling yet vul-
nerable account. Instead, globalization is creating a third alter-
native, something between a cosmopolis and a global commu-
nity.31 Accepting for this purpose communitarian theory’s
30. Contractarians also critique cosmopolitan theories of global justice
on related but different grounds. Contractarians also approach justice
through its social context, but understand the latter to involve what Rawls
calls participation in cooperative ventures for mutual advantage. This rela-
tionship is arguably “thinner” than communitarian relationships but essen-
tial for justice nonetheless. See John Linarelli, Principles of Fairness for Interna-
tional Economic Treaties: Constructivism and Contractualism, in TRADE AS THE
GUARANTOR OF PEACE, LIBERTY AND SECURITY?: CRITICAL, HISTORICAL AND EM-
PIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 124 (Padideh Alai, Tomer Broude & Colin Picker eds.,
2006) (elaborating a Scanlonian contractualist account in comparison with a
Rawslian account).
31. The notion that the global justice debate requires fresh thought and
new possibilities “between” or “beyond” existing dichotomous choices is
gaining momentum. See, e.g., RISSE, supra note 29, at 17 (defending a plural-
ist view of global justice “‘between’ two standard views, that principles of
justice apply only within States or else apply to all human beings”); Global
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12 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 46:1
characterization of both community and justice, I argue that
globalization is creating certain elements of community at the
global level, such as knowledge of inter-connectedness and of
the circumstances of others; and creating community in cer-
tain areas of global social relations such as economic relations,
by establishing that degree of social bond necessary to support
justice. While global social relations taken as a whole may not
rise in all cases at this time to the level of community that com-
munitarians posit, we find enough elements of community, and
enough pockets of community, to support an inquiry into jus-
tice even on communitarian terms in at least key areas of
global social relations such as fundamental rights and the
global economy.32 Among other implications, this allows for a
“Global Basic Package” or “global minimum ethics” approach
to global justice, consisting of a basic bundle of political, so-
cial, and economic rights safeguarded through global law and
delivered in a partnership between global and national institu-
tions. In fact, if the communitarian intuition about the social
dimension of justice holds true, and if this article is accurate
about globalization, then global justice is no longer simply a
debatable possibility—it is a fundamental and organic necessity
of the emerging global space, in the same way we consider jus-
tice a necessary element of domestic social life. I conclude by
arguing that globalization is changing not only the content of
our substantive norms but also the pace at which communal
bonds emerge, allowing us to begin envisioning a “post-global”
future.
In order to develop this argument, I examine in Part II
how globalization is making justice relevant to this new global
Justice, supra note 18, at 449–51 (arguing for a third alternative beyond statist
or cosmopolitan views). In my view, this development suggests the growing
recognition that global justice, by its very nature, requires a comprehensive
and pluralist approach that includes a diverse range of normative theory. See
FRANK J. GARCIA, GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THREE
TAKES (2013) (developing a pluralist approach to global justice theory and
discourse); see also RISSE, supra note 29 (advancing a theory of ‘pluralist inter-
nationalism’); SEN, supra note 14, at 1–27 (defending a ‘plural grounding’
approach to global justice).
32. This development is a key transformation underlying the emergence
of global law as well. See GIULIANA ZICCARDI CAPALDO, THE PILLARS OF GLOBAL
LAW, at xiv–xv (2008) (identifying expansion of the “social base” of interna-
tional law as a key variable in the emergence of contemporary global law).
On the notion of global law, see infra notes 141–153 and accompanying text.
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2013] BETWEEN COSMOPOLIS AND COMMUNITY 13
social level, using Rawls’s concept of the circumstances of jus-
tice and applying it to globalization. I then examine in greater
detail two particular aspects of globalization—the globaliza-
tion of knowledge, and the globalization of regulation—in
which these changes are salient and go to the heart of the
communitarian argument against global justice. In Part III, I
outline new possibilities which globalization opens for global
justice, extending the work of Walzer, Miller, and others, and
suggesting further directions for development. I conclude in
Part IV with a few observations on the pace of change and the
nature of history in this globalizing environment.
II. GLOBALIZATION: THE GAME CHANGER
A. Globalization and the Global Circumstances of Justice
As the most influential justice theorist of the twentieth
century, John Rawls and his work are a natural point of depar-
ture for considering justice theory for the twenty-first century.
In this section, I start with Rawls’s articulation of the relation-
ship between justice and our social and material environment.
I consider in Part III some of the more substantive implica-
tions of my thesis for Rawls’s seminal theory of Justice as Fair-
ness.33
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls selects a particular level of so-
cial relationships, the nation-State, and conceives of it “for the
time being” as a closed system separate from other nation
States.34 It is within this set of social relationships that the need
for and possibility of justice arises. Rawls discusses this phe-
33. Justice as Fairness has a voluminous and learned literature of com-
mentary, critique and elaboration, as befitting the most important political
theory of the twentieth century. For a useful entry point, see READING RAWLS
(Norman Daniels ed., 1989) (collecting initial critical responses to Rawls’s A
Theory of Justice); for a more recent comprehensive overview see Leif Wenar,
John Rawls, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL THEORY 393 (D. Estlund ed.,
2012).
34. Rawls is often cited as the leading contemporary theorist against the
possibility of global justice. However, it is critical to note that in his principal
work, A Theory of Justice, Rawls never argues that justice could not exist at the
global level. In fact, at the theoretical level, Rawls leaves open the possibility
of global justice, when he states more generally that justice could apply
“whenever there is an allotment of something rationally regarded as advanta-
geous or disadvantageous.” RAWLS, supra note 4, at 8. I will return to this
assumption below in Part III.
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14 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 46:1
nomenon through an inquiry into what he calls “the circum-
stances of justice.”35 The circumstances of justice are those
conditions of our situation that make cooperation both possi-
ble and necessary. Where they obtain, and they lead to such
cooperation, justice is relevant, and where they do not, justice
is not.
The circumstances of justice can be divided into two cate-
gories. The first category consists of three objective circum-
stances: a moderate scarcity of resources; a shared geographi-
cal territory; and a capacity to help or harm each other. In
other words: there is not enough to go around for everything
we each want to do; we are all going to be looking for these
resources in the same places; and we have the capacity to unite
to defeat one another’s goals, or work together to achieve
many of them. The second category is subjective and includes
two circumstances: people are mutually disinterested; and they
have conflicting claims. In other words, we are not generally
altruistic: We want what we want, and to get it, we go after what
each other has.
Because of these five circumstances, we are led to cooper-
ate as the rational means toward achieving our individual
ends. This, in essence, is society, which Rawls defines as a co-
operative venture for mutual advantage. As a consequence of
the circumstances of justice, we are led to form a variety of
social arrangements through which we hope to cooperate in
the furtherance of our mutual welfare. We need, however,
principles by which to choose among the various possible so-
cial arrangements, principles that will guide the distribution of
the fruits of this venture, and these are the principles of jus-
tice.
It is in this sense that society precedes justice. It is our
need to cooperate, as a response to the circumstances of jus-
tice, which leads us to form and consider a variety of social
arrangements for mutual advantage. “Justice,” as Rawls fa-
mously writes, is the “first virtue” of such social institutions.36
Absent the circumstances of justice, cooperation, and the de-
velopment of social mechanisms for the allocation of the fruits
of cooperation, there is simply nothing for justice to do.
35. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 126–30 (following Hume’s treatment).
36. Id. at 3.
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Applying these circumstances to the question of global
justice and global social relations, one sees that globaliza-
tion—in particular through its characteristic transnationaliza-
tion and interdependence—is bringing about the same cir-
cumstances of justice at the global level that Rawls described at
the domestic level. To begin with, there is of course the same
basic scarcity of resources at the global level, and through
globalization people are increasingly competing for these re-
sources on a global scale in a shared territory: our planet.37
That they are mutually disinterested and assert conflicting
claims over these resources does not need to be argued.
1. Capacity to Help
Because of globalization and its technical and economic
revolutions, we have an increasing capacity to effectively re-
spond to the needs and concerns of others beyond our bound-
aries through the transnational mobilization of information,
power, capital, or public opinion.38 Commentators have sug-
gested that earlier in our history, talk of global justice was pre-
mature, in the sense that our capacity to redistribute resources
across the globe was weak.39 Globalization creates the techni-
cal ability to affect global resource distribution, making the
question of its justice quite relevant now.40 For example,
global non-governmental networks facilitate the mobilization
of capital,41 labor,42 and policy expertise43 largely indepen-
37. Although it is true that not all resources can be equally well exploited
regardless of geographic proximity, and not all persons are equally well-
suited to compete globally for resources, such competition is undeniably oc-
curring even with respect to what are traditionally considered the most “lo-
cal” of resources: arable land and potable water. See generally Javier Perez,
Myriam Gistelinck & Dima Karbala, Sleeping Lions: International Investment
Treaties, State-Investor Disputes and Access to Food, Land and Water (Oxfam Dis-
cussion Papers, May 2011) (documenting the role of foreign investment in
shifting (and privatizing) ownership and access rights to these fundamental
resources).
38. This is a particular example of the general interconnectedness that
characterizes globalization today. See HELD ET AL., supra note 5, at 15.
39. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 22, at 9 (introducing and addressing the
“incapacity objection”).
40. Id. at 9–10.
41. Anupam Chandler cites the role of diaspora communities in mobiliz-
ing capital for homeland governments. Anupam Chandler, Diaspora Bonds,
76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1005, 1060–74 (2001).
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16 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 46:1
dent of state action, and thus largely independent of our tradi-
tional mechanisms for evaluating their justice and political le-
gitimacy.
By creating a real capacity to respond to another’s needs
and concerns, globalization contributes to an important ele-
ment of the rationale for both society and justice—in Rawls’
terms, the capacity to help.44 For communitarians, this is a crit-
ical element in the creation of global solidarity as well. But is
such solidarity emerging? I elaborate on this point below,45
but at this juncture would simply note that we see contempo-
rary evidence of such solidarity in our common response to
global needs and atrocities.46 This level of response, even if at
times still limited, weak, and inadequate, suggests an emerging
sense of solidarity or sense of community at the global level,
which for all its weaknesses would not have happened at all
100 years ago.47
42. Transnational NGOs such as Habitat for Humanity mobilize volun-
teer labor for cross-border projects in human environment restoration.
Arjun Appadurai, Patriotism and its Futures, in MODERNITY AT LARGE: CUL-
TURAL DIMENSIONS OF GLOBALIZATION 158, 167 (1996).
43. Wolfgang Reinicke, The Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy Net-
works, FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 1999–2000, at 44, 44–45 (discussing global
public policy networks experimenting with new ways to gather and distribute
knowledge across borders).
44. Even David Miller, a communitarian critic of global justice, acknowl-
edges that the “prosaic observation that the rich countries now have the
technical capacity to transfer large quantities of resources to the poorer
countries,” makes a prima facie case that such transfers have become morally
obligatory. Limits of Cosmopolitan Justice, supra note 3, at 164. Paradoxically,
the speed and scope of recent military interventions abroad also confirm our
capacity to bring significant resources to bear on short notice on a global
scale. I am indebted to Jim Henle for pointing this out.
45. See infra Section C.
46. Put another way, it is also our sense of failure when our response to
humanitarian crises abroad is inadequate, despite having both knowledge
and capacity, which renders such a failure an injustice. See PETER SINGER,
ONE WORLD: THE ETHICS OF GLOBALIZATION 156–58 (2002) (citing example
of 1970’s humanitarian crisis in Bangladesh).
47. Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus list Rwanda and Somalia as ex-
amples of a weak solidarity, which can suggest either that the concept of
global community is either half-full or half empty. They decide it is half full,
asking “[a]fter all, who would have cared—and how—a hundred years ago.”
Bruno Simma & Andreas Paulus, The “International Community”: Facing the
Challenge of Globalization, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 226, 276 (1998).
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2. Capacity to Harm
Because of globalization, we also increasingly find that
our State’s policies and our own political and consumer
choices are influencing the life prospects of others in direct
and dramatic ways. The globalization of markets means that in
many cases we are directly profiting from the economic and
social conditions in other parts of the world through out-
sourced services, low wages, multinational production
processes, mutual fund and pension plan investment returns,
etc. The very fabric of global society—its division of territory
and jurisdiction to political entities called States—is a social
arrangement for which we are collectively responsible.48 Thus,
completing Rawls’s basic conditions, we have the capacity to
harm each other as well.49
This capacity to harm each other globally is an important
element in creating a sense of solidarity, understood as a sense
of responsibility for one other. Through our economic inter-
dependence, we have to take seriously the possibility that we
are contributing to the socioeconomic circumstances of
others, a basic criterion of community.50 Our responsibility
over the effects, even attenuated, of our own conduct at the
global level is a rationale for global justice that, it has been
suggested, transcends the entire cosmopolitan-communitarian
divide.51
Together, these global circumstances of justice, especially
our capacity to both help and harm each other, make justice
both possible and necessary at the global level, and begin con-
tributing to the formation of those deeper bonds we call soli-
darity. I now turn to two further aspects of globalization that
48. Globalization and Justice, supra note 8, at 129–30.
49. Thus globalization extends to the level of the individual as global ac-
tor, which is the basic argument Barry and others make about states and
transnational harms. See BRIAN BARRY, THEORIES OF JUSTICE 185–86 (1989) (if
we “take seriously” the circumstances of justice argument at the interna-
tional level, we must take into account our capacity for inflicting transna-
tional harms through the state system).
50. This is also a basic element of justice in the social contract tradition:
Obligations apply when one has accepted the benefits of the social arrange-
ment, or taken advantage of the opportunities it offers to further one’s inter-
ests.
51. Globalization and Justice, supra note 8, at 129; RICHARD MILLER,
GLOBALIZING JUSTICE 59–77 (2010).
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bring us even closer to meeting the criteria communitarians
lay down for justice: a global community of knowledge and
shared traditions, practices, and understandings.
B. A Global Community of Knowledge
One of the salient features of contemporary globalization
is its effect on information flows. As a result of the global tele-
communications revolution, the Internet, and the develop-
ment of both global media and the capability to organize so-
cial concern at a global level (through networks of NGOs, for
example), globalization is creating what can be referred to as a
global community of knowledge.52 Such knowledge is both a
factor in our increasing interdependence, and—most criti-
cally—the essential vehicle through which we come to under-
stand our deepening interdependence, with the symbolic, so-
cial, and legal ramifications such knowledge brings.
Through globalization, we know a great deal, immediately
and intimately, about the suffering of people in other parts of
the world; indeed, we are more familiar with their suffering
now than we ever were previously.53 Moreover, this flow of in-
formation is not simply about global harms to “poor Others.”
Globalization—particularly its global security and global fi-
nance aspects—is also contributing to a shared sense of vul-
nerability to “remote” forces even among citizens of wealthy,
developed nations.54
52. See, e.g., Dirk Messner, World Society—Structures and Trends, in GLOBAL
TRENDS AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 7, at 46–50 (discussing the cen-
trality of knowledge, its diffusion, and its networks in shaping a global episte-
mic and cognitive community). This global community of knowledge reflects
on a wider scale the globalization of scientific knowledge—a phenomenon
that predates and parallels the globalization of other forms of knowledge,
and itself contributes to a shared epistemic community and shared knowl-
edge base for key social questions. See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD,
GLOBALIZATION OF SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING RESEARCH (2010) (demonstrat-
ing that science and engineering research is increasingly an international
endeavor); THE ROYAL SOCIETY, KNOWLEDGE, NETWORKS AND NATIONS:
GLOBAL SCIENTIFIC COLLABORATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY (2011) (a review of
the globalizing nature of scientific research).
53. HELD ET AL., supra note 5, at 58 (asserting that the globalization and
telecommunications revolution brings people into other social realities they
otherwise would not know).
54. Paul Schiff Berman, From International Law to Law and Globalization, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 516 (2005) [hereinafter Law and Globalization]
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One specific type of shared knowledge important to
globalization is the growing recognition of the risks we share
as human beings on this planet, and the growing recognition
of our shared interest in addressing those risks. In this sense,
globalization is “de-territorializing” risk, creating what can be
called a “community of risk.”55 The literature is remarkably
consistent in its listing of common risks facing all human be-
ings: war and security challenges; climate change and environ-
mental degradation; economic crises and increased economic
competition and dislocation; infectious disease and global
pandemics; natural disasters; and rapid population growth, to
name a few.56  Moreover, the desire for security, environmen-
tal well-being, and sustainable development can be found
across all cultures.57
Although awareness of shared risks is not by itself enough
to create community, such international conditions lead to a
shared interest in survival and development.58 It is significant,
moreover, that such shared interests exist and are recognized
as such, since this creates conditions favoring increased coop-
eration, which can lead to a sense of common purpose in
fighting these risks.
(“We [meaning the United States] also may feel the growing significance of
‘remote’ forces on our lives, whether those forces are multinational corpora-
tions, global terrorist organizations, world capital markets or distant bureau-
cracies such as the European Union.”); Rob Waugh, Does One Super-Corpora-
tion Run the Global Economy?: Study Claims It Could Be Terrifyingly Unstable, THE
DAILY MAIL, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-
2051008/Does-super-corporation-run-global-economy.html (documenting
financial and economic interconnectedness and potential systemic conse-
quences).
55. Messner, supra note 52, at 24 (discussing a ‘global risk community’);
Nuscheler, supra note 7, at 158–59 (citing the interdependent nature of a
‘global risk society’).
56. Messner, supra note 52, at 24; Nuscheler, supra note 7, at 158–59.
President Obama alluded to this in his September 23, 2009 remarks to the
United Nations General Assembly, in which he said the self-interests of states
have never been more aligned than they are today. President Barack Obama,
First Speech to the United Nations General Assembly (Sept. 23, 2009), avail-
able at http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/09/23/obama.transcript/in
dex.html.
57. See Simma & Paulus, supra note 47, at 272 (listing bases for a dialogue
on a minimal set of common values).
58. Even a realist like Stanley Hoffman acknowledges this much. STANLEY
HOFFMAN, DUTIES BEYOND BORDERS 37 (1981).
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Taken together, these various types of knowledge also sat-
isfy a basic requirement for community: the effective capacity
to know one another’s needs, concerns, and preferences.59
This knowledge forms the basis for Miller’s social determina-
tion of “need” and “whose needs count,” as well as the basis for
Walzer’s shared understandings. This goes beyond the global
circumstances of justice argument I outlined above:60 We not
only have the capacity to help or harm each other at a global
scale, but we know that we do, and we know what such help or
harm looks like. Further, globalization is eliminating, or at
least reducing, the spatial and temporal barriers to our knowl-
edge of one another’s needs, preferences, and situations, mak-
ing it possible to recognize, develop, and exercise effective re-
sponsibility for one another’s well-being in a similar manner to
that which communitarians cite as essential to national com-
munity.
Nevertheless, the mere fact that we are increasingly aware
of one another’s situation and increasingly capable of re-
sponding to it across vast distances of time and space is not by
itself enough to create solidarity or community. Put another
way, the existence of the basis for solidarity is not sufficient to
create solidarity itself. Can we say that such solidarity is emerg-
ing at the global level? This becomes a key question for any
communitarian argument about global justice.
C. Globalization and Shared Traditions, Practices,
and Understandings
In order to more fully evaluate whether solidarity or com-
munity is emerging from our mutual knowledge and the rec-
ognition of our shared risks, we need to look more carefully at
how we are responding. The community of knowledge and risk
I outlined above is increasingly becoming a community of
shared traditions, practices, and understandings concerning
how we respond to such knowledge and risks. These responses
grow, both spontaneously and institutionally, out of our per-
59. See Ethical Significance of Nationality, supra note 17, at 653–54 (citing
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN
AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1991) (noting the importance of media in al-
lowing dispersed bodies of people to think of themselves as belonging to a
single community)).
60. See supra Section A.
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ception of shared needs and interests, our capacity to help and
to harm, and our awareness of each other’s plight—in short,
our understanding of globalization as interlocking our fates.
Globalization has been a powerful force for supporting
the development of shared practices at many levels. At the su-
perficial level of popular culture, many have noted (often with
concern) the harmonizing tendencies of globalization
through mass consumption of Western cultural products.61
More fundamentally, the “de-territorialization” associated with
the cross-border human and cultural migrations characteristic
of contemporary globalization is breaking down the notion of
territorially distinct, epistemically unique “cultures” or “com-
munities” due to “social and economic processes that connect
. . . even the most isolated of local settings with a wider
world.”62 At the associational level, enterprises such as mul-
tinational corporations, NGOs, and global scientific coopera-
tion bodies build and constitute their own epistemic commu-
nities across national boundaries, which also contribute to the
development of shared traditions and practices.63 Finally, at
the regulatory level, the post-war growth of universally recog-
nized international human rights has played a particularly im-
61. See, e.g., Barnet & Cavanagh, supra note 8, at 71–77 (noting the ho-
mogenizing effect that Western products are having on cultures globally).
62. See Law and Globalization, supra note 54, at 512 (citing Akhil Gupta &
James Ferguson, Culture, Power, Place: Ethnography at the End of an Era, in CUL-
TURE, POWER, PLACE: EXPLORATIONS IN CRITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 1, 1 (1997)).
Of course, as I noted above, not all are engaged, or equally engaged, in this
new global space, even as all may in some sense be affected by it and there-
fore “within” it. See GLOBALIZATION WITH A HUMAN FACE, supra note 12, at 31
(“Economic integration is thus dividing developing and transition econo-
mies into those that are benefiting from global opportunities and those that
are not.”).
63. See Law and Globalization, supra note 54, at 500 (noting the role of
institutional bureaucracies in implementing international norms); GUNTHER
TEUBNER, NETWORKS AS CONNECTED CONTRACTS (Hugh Collins ed., Michelle
Everson trans., 2011) (discussing the important emergence of networks as
cooperative business arrangements); Messner, supra note 52, at 22, 31 (“One
of the effects of international joint ventures between companies as well as of
various forms of coordination and cooperation between the different levels
of action of the global governance architecture is that actor orientations and
modes of action are mutually intertwined, influenced, altered, and reconsti-
tuted across international borders.”).
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portant role in international law’s status as a global set of
shared practices and understandings.64
In the next section, I take a closer look at two fundamen-
tal sets of widely shared practices: the social significance of
markets as an economic structure (“market society”), and our
shared approaches to regulating markets (“institutions”). Mar-
kets and our regulation of them are not only central to our
contemporary way of life, but they also highlight the interplay
between globalization and our structural, community-building
responses to the fundamental interconnectedness that perme-
ates twenty-first century social reality.
1. Shared Understandings and Practices about Markets
The global market society created through globalization
results in a complex shared practice or set of practices that
contributes to a global community of shared understandings
about socioeconomic organization.65 At this point in world his-
tory, it is possible to say that virtually all people live in some
form of organized market economy. Globalization has been
both a facilitator and accelerator of this trend, and not without
significant controversy.66 However, for our purposes here, it is
64. Terry Nardin, Legal Positivism as a Theory of International Society, in IN-
TERNATIONAL SOCIETY: DIVERSE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 3, at 17–35.
65. See generally Andrew Hurrell, Global Inequality and International Institu-
tions, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 34 (2001) (arguing that the increasing intercon-
nectedness of global society has made global justice more realistic).
66. One way to view globalization is as the world-wide extension of the
transition to market society that European culture went through in the sev-
enteenth to nineteenth centuries. See Anthony Giddens, The Globalizing of
Modernity, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 8, at 60,
60–65 (citing globalization as the global spread of modernity, with all of its
characteristic features and complications). This can lead to two kinds of ten-
sions. First, since market society’s patterns of contractual exchange are cor-
rosive of old status-based patterns and the power that flowed from them,
globalization will be viewed as threatening to the old social order and chal-
lenged by those who benefited from entrenched social patterns or are less
favored by the new dispensations. Giddens considers this an aspect of the
cultural globalization that, together with industrialization and the rise of
global media, has “torn the modern away from the traditional.” Id. at 65.
Second, to the extent that globalization is understood as extending a partic-
ular version of market society—under-regulated capitalism or the “Washing-
ton Consensus,” for example—globalization will be resisted as partisan by
those who view this particular ideology as inimical to the interests of the
non-capital classes. This complaint is more a normative judgment about the
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the ubiquity of the market itself that is significant from the
perspective of shared understandings and practices, not its
controversial nature.
The widespread use of the market does not, of course,
mean that all countries have identical interests with respect to
markets or identical forms of market society. To take just one
example, the United States and Germany (two of the world’s
most developed countries) practice advanced capitalist forms
of market economy which differ in important ways such as
competition policy, labor-management relations, tolerance
level for economic inequality among citizens, and social wel-
fare policies.67 The contrast is even more marked when one
ventures beyond comparison between the United States and
Western European market societies and looks at Asian capital-
ism, even Chinese capitalism.68 In fact, markets have been
touted on instrumental grounds precisely because they can fa-
cilitate efficient transfers among people who do not necessarily
share identical conceptions of the good.69
Nevertheless, market society has certain attributes—the
need for bureaucratic regulation, recognition of private prop-
erty, and functioning civil courts, to name a few—which by vir-
tue of their significant spill-over effects, contribute to the for-
mation of important shared interests among participants.70
global spread of under-regulated capitalism than a judgment on the global
economy per se. See Hopkins, supra note 12, at 42–43 (discussing dangers
posed by weakened regulatory power over capitalist system).
67. See POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN CAPITALISM (Colin Crouch &
Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1997) (comparing Anglo-American, European and
Asian models of capitalism). For a nuanced account of the role of national
economies—and their differences—in the global economy, see ROBERT
GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ORDER (2001).
68. Crouch & Streeck, supra note 67. See generally YASHENG HUANG, SELL-
ING CHINA: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT DURING THE REFORM ERA (2003);
DALI YANG, BEYOND BEIJING: LIBERALIZATION AND THE REGIONS IN CHINA
(1997); DAVID ZWEIG, INTERNATIONALIZING CHINA: DOMESTIC INTERESTS AND
GLOBAL LINKAGES (2002); MINXIN PEI, CHINA’S TRAPPED TRANSITION: THE
LIMITS OF DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOCRACY (2006).
69. Globalization and Justice, supra note 8, at 130. This is one of the more
promising aspects of a global market. The more sinister is a global race to
the bottom through deregulation.
70. See, e.g., DAN SLATER & FRAN TONKISS, MARKET SOCIETY: MARKETS AND
MODERN SOCIAL THEORY 92–116 (2001) (surveying the range of institutions
which markets require and/or are embedded in).
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Such liberal pro-market norms have been called the “germ of
a universal consciousness” insofar as they have come to be
held in common by developed and developing market states.71
One category of shared practices around markets is partic-
ularly significant for the purposes of this article: the practice of
regulating the market through institutions. Most market socie-
ties have experience in developing domestic institutions capa-
ble of supplementing and mitigating the rigors of capitalism,
for example by compensating the “losers” through some form
of wealth transfer. But what is truly distinctive about the
emerging global economy is the shared recognition of the
need for institutions regulating the market at a trans-national
level.72 This is but one aspect of a larger move toward meta-
state institutions at a global level.
2. Shared Understandings, Meta-State Institutions, and a Global
Basic Structure
Perhaps the strongest evidence of an emerging global
community involves our recognition of a shared need to look
to institutions beyond the State in order to frame an adequate
social response to many of the problems and challenges we
face.73 This shared need is more than an intensification of
prior trends toward internationalization, just as meta-state in-
stitutions are not just a specialized regulatory tool of States for
certain problems in international relations. The need for in-
creased global governance, rather, is itself a shared under-
standing characteristic of this new social space, and the reality
71. Stanley Hoffman, Clash of Globalizations, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMA-
TIONS READER, supra note 8, at 106 (citing Raymond Aron).
72. This does not mean, of course, that there is agreement on the nature
of such institutions or on what ideology should guide their market regula-
tion. See, e.g., Deborah James, Who Should Run the Global Economy?, AL
JAZEERA, Apr. 23, 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2012/
04/2012422104847102233.html.
73. Keohane and Nye refer to this as an aspect of “complex interdepen-
dence”: “More and more issues are up for grabs internationally, including
regulations and practices—ranging from pharmaceutical testing to account-
ing and product standards to banking regulation—that were formerly re-
garded as the prerogatives of national governments.” ROBERT O. KEOHANE &
JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE 246 (2001).
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of global governance by its nature constitutes a shared prac-
tice.74
Globalization’s many facets are together pushing us to-
ward increased cooperation at the meta-state level. Returning
to Rawls’s account of the circumstances of justice, the rational
human response to these circumstances is to enter into sys-
tems of social cooperation for mutual advantage. Through this
cooperation we create “society,” in particular the “basic struc-
ture”—i.e., the institutions we employ to allocate resources
and opportunities, and which thereby directly affect our life
prospects.75
By leading us to create new institutions and shift responsi-
bility for many social allocations to the meta-state level, global-
ization is creating a global basic structure.76 Through global-
ization, we find ourselves in precisely the sort of cooperative
venture for mutual advantage that is the subject of justice; we
also share the fruits of social cooperation (trade opportunities,
for example) through meta-state institutions such as the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and the European Union.77 These
organizations, in addressing such needs, are involved in allo-
cating the benefits and burdens of social cooperation—such as
rights, opportunities, privileges, membership, and resources—
activities that have been traditionally understood in the do-
74. See, e.g., RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL
LAW, AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman eds.,
2009) [hereinafter RULING THE WORLD] (surveying global institutions and
cataloguing the emerging constitutionalization of global governance). It is
useful at this juncture to recall the point I discussed earlier, that understand-
ings and practices can be debated and contested without necessarily render-
ing them not “shared”—this has to be so or there are in fact no communities
at all.
75. See RAWLS, supra note 4, at 8.
76. THOMAS W. POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 240–80 (1989); JONES, supra
note 22, at 8; Westphalian World, supra note 26, at 705–06.
77. CHARLES BEITZ, POLITICAL THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
166–67 (1979) [hereinafter POLITICAL THEORY]; JONES, supra note 22, at 8;
Westphalian World, supra note 26, at 705–06. Thomas Eskelinen warns us,
however, that while such institutions doubtless comprise a global basic struc-
ture, they cannot be fully understood nor reformed toward a more just ar-
rangement without proper consideration of the agendas pursued by power-
ful individual governments within their frameworks. Thomas Eskelinen,
Global Basic Structure and Institutions: The WTO as a Practical Example, 7 J.
GLOBAL ETHICS 47, 47 (2011).
34502-nyi_46-1 S
heet N
o. 15 S
ide B
      02/26/2014   09:18:43
34502-nyi_46-1 Sheet No. 15 Side B      02/26/2014   09:18:43
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\46-1\NYI101.txt unknown Seq: 26 26-FEB-14 8:31
26 INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS [Vol. 46:1
mestic sphere to make justice both relevant and necessary.78 In
fact, global social regulation today is increasingly conducted
through a complex partnership consisting of such meta-state
institutions, States and their constituent units, international
organizations, and non-State actors, through mechanisms such
as the market, all regulated through international law.79 In
Rawlsian terms, such global level institutional arrangements
“define men’s [sic] rights and duties and influence their life
prospects, what they can expect to be and how well they can
hope to do.”80
This global basic structure could be seen as merely tending
toward the creation of global society, which in the communi-
tarian view does not go far enough for global community.
There are, however, at least four ways in which this shift to-
ward a transnational and meta-state partnership has profound
communitarian consequences.
First, this shift suggests that the communitarian assump-
tion of bounded distributive communities no longer holds at
the nation-state level, necessitating a shift to a “higher” or
“more inclusive” level of community in which relevant distribu-
tive decisions are also taken. This “higher” level is the transna-
tional level. Walzer describes the political community of justice
as one “capable of arranging [its] own patterns of division and
exchange, justly or unjustly.”81 When a community is no
longer capable of fixing its own patterns of division and ex-
change, it is no longer sufficient to analyze the justice of that
78. “ . . . [T]here is a global basic structure, which, like the domestic
basic structure, is an important subject of justice because it has profound
and enduring effects on the prospects of individuals and groups . . . .” West-
phalian World, supra note 26, at 700–01.
79. JONES, supra note 22, at 8 (“[T]he institutions and quasi-formal ar-
rangements affecting persons’ life prospects throughout the world are in-
creasingly international ones—international financial institutions, transna-
tional corporations, the G8, the World Trade Organization . . . .”). See also
SEN, supra note 14, at 409 (“The distribution of benefits of global relations
depends not only on domestic policies but on a variety of international so-
cial arrangements . . . .”).
80. RAWLS, supra note 4, at 7; but see Global Justice, supra note 18, at 447
(Maffetone, a Rawlsian, arguing that empirical evidence of a global basic
structure is inconclusive).
81. SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 31.
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community with sole reference to itself.82 In other words, una-
ble to fix its own distributions entirely itself, the community is
not capable of delivering its own justice. We must therefore
look to that further level of institutions that is affecting that
community’s distributions, and to its justice as well.
The drive toward a higher level of institutions is precisely
the effect of globalization.83 In Andrew Hurrell’s words,
“[I]ntegration and globalization have eroded and undermined
the boundedness of political communities whose particular
cultures, traditions and ways of living are given so much weight
by communitarians.”84 From a distributive justice perspective,
globalization is revealing domestic society to be an incomplete
community (even as it is also an agent rendering domestic so-
ciety increasingly less complete), incapable of securing the
overall well-being of its members by itself, thus prompting us
to look to a higher level of community as part of group efforts
to secure well-being.85 Even the many anti-globalization pro-
tests focused on Bretton Woods institutions indicate the grow-
ing awareness that these institutions increasingly constrain al-
locative decision-making at the national level, even as these in-
stitutions engage in positive distributive functions as well (such
as the allocation of trade benefits, crisis financing, and devel-
opment aid), though often falling short in this role.86
82. This also echoes criticisms made about the validity of Rawls’s assump-
tion of self-contained national distributive communities in his analysis of do-
mestic justice.
83. See Alberto Tita, Globalization: A New Political and Economic Space Re-
quiring Supranational Governance, 32 J. WORLD TRADE 47, 49 (1998) (globaliza-
tion leads to internal pressures on States as traditional macroeconomic pol-
icy tools “becom[e] less and less capable of being determined at a national
level by democratically elected governments.”).
84. Hurrell, supra note 65, at 36.
85. See also Robert P. George, Natural Law and International Order, in IN-
TERNATIONAL SOCIETY: DIVERSE ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 54–69 (Davd Mapel &
Terry Nardin, eds., 1998) (“[T]he national state can no longer (if it ever
could) secure the conditions of its citizens’ overall well-being (that is, their
common good) without more or less systematically coordinating its activities
with other nation states and, indeed, without the active assistance of supra-
national institutions.”).
86. It is in this sense that Teubner characterizes such protest movements
as “parasitic” (though I would choose a different word): “They presuppose
specialized institutions with high problem-solving potential, which they ac-
cuse of over-specialized tunnel vision and can provoke into innovations.”
Gunther Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo-Spontaneous Law and Dual Con-
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Second, the fact that globalization is forcing us to look to
international institutions such as the United Nations and the
WTO for global policy solutions has an inherent community-
building effect. The role played by common institutions shar-
ing a common language in building polities out of disparate
peoples has long been recognized in international relations as
well as domestic politics as “nation-building.”87 Our increasing
tendency to look, at least in part, to meta-state institutions for
responses to social and environmental problems globally, re-
flects a shared understanding that such institutions play an in-
creasingly prominent role in formulating or channeling social
policy decisions and orchestrating social welfare responses,
and that few States can act without them on any important
social issue.88
Third, the role of institutions in global regulation—eco-
nomic and otherwise—is itself increasingly recognized as a
source of norm-creation and shared understandings.  “Once
created, institutions act as platforms for on going normative
debate, for the mobilization of concern, and for debating and
revising ideas about how international society should be or-
ganized.”89 For this reason, such institutions themselves can
stitution of Autonomous Sectors in World Society?, in GLOBALIZATION AND PUBLIC
GOVERNANCE 71, 81  (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2000). On the re-distributive
potential of the Bretton Woods Institutions see, e.g., Frank J. Garcia, Global
Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL EC-
ONOMIC LAW 23 (William J. Davey & John Jackson eds., 2008).
87. Will Kymlicka, Territorial Boundaries: A Liberal Egalitarian Perspective, in
BOUNDARIES AND JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 249, 256; see also Hurrell, supra
note 65, at 39 (on how state institutions are tremendously important in the
creation and development of national communities). We in the United
States are no strangers to this phenomenon: We reinforce our shared iden-
tity as a nation when we look to the Federal level for resource allocations and
policy responses, as in the case of natural disasters or security crises.
88. Hurrell, supra note 65, at 39. In this sense, even the anti-globalization
protests contribute to the community globalization is creating, insofar as
they take up one part of a larger global debate over the most humane ideol-
ogy for global market society. According to Sen, “Even our shared frustra-
tions and shared thoughts on global helplessness can unite rather than di-
vide.” SEN, supra note 14, at 173.
89. Hurrell, supra note 65, at 42. A current example of this idea is re-
flected in the critique of the United Nations for failing to interfere in the
Syrian crisis. See, e.g., Saira Mohamed, The UN Security Council and the Crisis in
Syria, INSIGHTS (AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.), Mar. 12, 2012.
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“move different States and societies towards ‘shared under-
standings of the meaning of social goods.’”90
Fourth, this shift toward meta-state institutions represents
the emergence of a shared understanding with respect to regu-
lating global social conflict. When responding to the fact of
social conflict, particularly conflict over what are purportedly
“shared” understandings, communitarians shift the level of
analysis to a secondary set of practices and understandings, a
system for managing conflicts over understandings and their
application. For example, Walzer suggests that disagreement
over the meaning of social goods—where a given social under-
standing is controversial—triggers a sort of “second order” set
of understandings concerning how disputes are to expressed,
managed, and adjudicated, and even mechanisms for “alterna-
tive distributions.”91 In addressing a similar problem concern-
ing the relation between nationality and ethnicity in an ethni-
cally plural nation-state, Miller creates a similar distinction, be-
tween public and private culture.92 Both approaches suggest a
hierarchy of shared understandings, reminiscent of H.L.A.
Hart’s distinction between primary and secondary legal
rules.93
This approach to social conflict—shifting the level of
analysis to “understandings about understandings,” or “shared
public cultures”—casts a community’s identity in a different
light. It seems communitarians are linking justice at the na-
tional level to a kind of shared institutional culture, rather
than a simple community of shared primary beliefs; what com-
munitarians are identifying when they speak of the common
good is really a commitment to the second-order set of under-
90. Hurrell, supra note 65, at 42–43 (citing WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE,
supra note 17, at xiv.). This may or may not also reinforce the cultural ho-
mogenization tendencies many commentators note with alarm about global-
ization. See supra note 8. However, my point here is about social goods in a
distributive sense, not consumer goods.
91. SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 313.
92. Noting that nationality as a fact is often created out of disparate eth-
nic groups and even forced upon minority ethnic groups with prior existing
identities of their own, Miller posits a bifurcation of national culture, be-
tween a shared public culture and differing private cultures. Ethical Signifi-
cance of Nationality, supra note 17, at 657–58.
93. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961) (primary rules are those
that actually govern conduct whereas secondary rules are those that govern
primary and secondary rules).
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standings about disputes, the rules about rules or “public cul-
ture.”94 If this is so, then what we are talking about when we
discuss community at the national level is something more like
governance: shared social institutions for conflict management,
decision-making over resource allocation, and the administra-
tion of justice, operating according to shared understandings
and standing astride a range of smaller normative communi-
ties.
This move to a second or public set of shared understand-
ings about justice is important for the question of global jus-
tice because it suggests a location for understandings about
global justice that are independent of primary understandings
or nationality-based commitments, which are understandably
plural and divergent. If we understand Walzer and Miller to
say that shared understandings of justice involve agreements
over the priority of public over private culture in certain cases,
or agreements about the institutional management of conflict-
ing claims, then we can look for global justice and the a priori
community for global justice by looking at the emerging meta-
state or public culture for shared understandings concerning
conflicting global claims. In other words, global community, as
far as justice is concerned, may look less like a single global
community in the national sense of shared identity, culture,
and history (to the degree even those are commonly shared in
a modern, complex nation State), and more like a global set of
shared understandings about claims and conflicts, or a global
public culture.95 We may find more of a consensus over this
public culture and these secondary understandings than a sim-
ple survey of the diverse range of primary understandings and
private cultures would suggest.96
94. Thus framed, the sense is closer to what Maffetone calls a second,
“less intuitive,” but valid reading of Rawls’s “priority of right,” namely a re-
striction of comprehensive conceptions of the good to the “political” con-
ception. Global Justice, supra note 18, at 445.
95. This might resemble, for example, what Sebastiano Maffetone calls
the creation of a global public reason. Sebastiano Maffetone, The Fragile
Fabric of Public Reason, in THE DIALOGUE, VOL. 3: REASON AND REASONABLE-
NESS 407, 407–10 (Ricardo Dottori ed., 2005).
96. This starts to look more like the liberal commitment to institutions
for managing social conflicts among people with differing visions of the
good, and suggests more common ground with communitarians than may at
first be apparent.
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If so, the ongoing shift to meta-state institutions has
profound consequences for global justice. Quoting Hurrell’s
excellent analysis:
[T]he density, scope and complexity of the agree-
ments, norms, and rules in which states and societies
are already enmeshed provide some basis for positing
a community interest or an agreed set of purposes
and values against which new substantive norms may
be judged—the idea of an objective community inter-
est or of the common interest of global society.97
When global social relations involve conflicts between incom-
plete national communities of justice over allocative decisions,
globalization can bump us up a level, invoking a new shared
understanding that the meta-state level is the place to resolve
this conflict, according to new understandings regarding ap-
propriate distributions, and norms in general, at the global
level. Insofar as these global practices deepen and extend, we
see stronger shared traditions and practices of global social
policy formation and allocative decision-making.98 In the de-
velopment of new forms of meta-state institutional govern-
ance, we are developing a new form of shared understanding,
or rules about rules, at the global level.
These changes have significant communitarian conse-
quences regarding justice, based on new meta-national claims
for our loyalty. For example, Miller defends our partiality to
compatriots in part on the basis of the many fundamental
roles that the nation plays in the identity and flourishing of its
members. To the extent that global meta-state institutions
both constrain the nation’s role, and arrogate elements of this
role to themselves, they can create corresponding transna-
tional claims on our loyalties, supporting new transnational
distributions of goods and resources. In a similar way, Richard
Miller also attempts to justify a limited form of partiality on the
basis of shared institutions and mutual expectations: If we are
relying on people’s loyalty in a shared enterprise, we had bet-
97. Hurrell, supra note 65, at 41.
98. Recent examples of this include the transformation of the GATT into
the WTO system in tandem with the globalization of the world economy and
the emergence of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision as a key
source of global financial accords in the wake of the global financial crisis.
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ter be loyal to them.99 At the global level, this means that to
the extent we share institutions, we owe each other some de-
gree of partiality at the global level.
This kind of shared participation goes beyond mere par-
ticipation in a cooperative scheme. Quoting Walzer, “Over a
long period of time, shared experiences and cooperative activ-
ity of many different kinds shape a common life.”100 It is pre-
cisely such a common life that globalization, the global econ-
omy, and global regulation are developing among all of us
who share this planet.
III. NEW GLOBAL POSSIBILITIES
I have argued that in global social relations today we see,
both inter-subjectively and at the regulatory level, the constitu-
tive elements of a limited global community emerging. In this
manner, traditional contractarian and communitarian objec-
tions to the possibility of global justice are being weakened by
globalization itself. My goal thus far has been to suggest why
globalization is itself changing the very nature of the phenom-
ena that moral and political theories of global justice seek to
explore. Therefore, my main effort has been to establish a link
between our evaluation of the claims of contractarian and
communitarian theory, and our empirical evaluation of the so-
cial changes of globalization.
Now I will turn to some substantive suggestions as to the
shape of global justice as informed by globalization and its ef-
fects on contractarian and communitarian approaches, and I
will examine how this analysis of globalization might suggest
new possibilities. The challenge—and the opportunity—are
clear: Paraphrasing Domingo, society is globalizing, but States
(and international law) and contractarian and communitarian
theories of justice are merely internationalized.101
99. RICHARD MILLER, supra note 51, at 43–46.
100. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 54 (2006).
101. RAFAEL DOMINGO, THE NEW GLOBAL LAW (2010). As a general matter,
global justice theory has assumed social and inter-State relations as they were
“pre-globalization” even as they have discussed globalization as a phenome-
non, that is, either looking at universal normative or legal obligations on
strictly theoretical or positivist grounds (as cosmopolitans and human rights
advocates do) or at social relations on a national level (as contractarian or
communitarian critics do), but seldom looking at the transformed social ba-
sis for transnational normative obligations, as I am suggesting.
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A. Shifting the Transnational Justice Frontier
In much the same way that changes in technology can
shift production possibility frontiers for a given economy,102
globalization has shifted the “transnational justice frontier” for
theories which limit justice according to underlying social rela-
tions.
1. Rawls and Global Justice as Fairness?
Globalization, including the global economy and the
emergence of global regulation, allows us to definitively move
beyond Rawls’s limitation of Justice as Fairness to domestic so-
ciety to a more concrete conception of a global Justice as Fair-
ness. The developments in globalization, the global economy,
and global regulation discussed here have rendered Rawls’s as-
sumption of a closed domestic society untenable today even at
the level of theory.103 Simply put, global economic interdepen-
dence makes it impossible for any one domestic society to
completely deliver and safeguard for its citizens the conditions
necessary for just allocations of social goods. Instead, Justice as
Fairness should be constructed with inter-dependent societies
in mind, and then evaluated as it applies generally to global
issues of social justice.
The fact of economic interdependence among the
world’s societies is a key element in establishing the possibility
of any contractarian argument for international distributive
obligations.104 A primary motivating force behind the need for
justice, according to Rawls, is that some mechanism is needed
102. PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 11–15
(2010).
103. In his study of the concept of fairness in international law, Franck
concludes that the requisite level of community has emerged at the interna-
tional level to sustain a fairness analysis. THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS 12–13 (1998). For similar reasons,
Pogge argues that Rawls’s bifurcation of the choice problems into separate
domestic and international ones is untenable, because the international en-
vironment in which States actually operate will significantly affect the nature
of domestic societies, something representatives should know in the original
position if they are to ratify their choices post-veil of ignorance. POGGE, supra
note 76, at 255–56.
104. POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 77, at 166–67; Westphalian World, supra
note 26, at 705. In a similar sense, Pogge argues that the emergence of a
single global institutional scheme involving both international law and terri-
torial States has made all human rights violations “at least potentially every-
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to allocate the advantages that arise from social cooperation.
One can argue, therefore, that wherever social cooperation
has created some wealth or advantage which otherwise would
not exist, the social predicate exists for the application of jus-
tice.105 As Charles Beitz puts it in his seminal study of political
philosophy and international law: “[T]he requirements of jus-
tice apply to institutions and practices (whether or not they
are genuinely cooperative) in which social activity produces
relative or absolute benefits or burdens that would not exist if
the social activity did not take place.”106
Trade and international economic relations satisfy this
condition because they lead to increases in individual and na-
tional wealth through the operation of comparative advantage
and principles of efficiency in general. As the international
trade regulatory system has grown in scope and institutional
capacity with the creation of the WTO, the gains from such
social cooperation increase, as does the institutional capacity
for allocative decision-making and enforcement of resulting
norms. One might say, therefore, that at a minimum, interna-
tional economic relations in the contemporary global system
satisfy the minimum requisites for a consideration of the
claims of justice, which would apply to the allocation of the
social goods that are the subject of the treaty in question.
In this sense, international economic relations and inter-
national economic law can be said to involve the creation of
benefits from social cooperation. The need to allocate such
benefits raises precisely the same sort of issues raised in domes-
tic society when such benefits stand to be allocated. Therefore,
even if there is a justifiable distinction between domestic and
international society for some purposes, with regard to the ap-
one’s concern.” Thomas W. Pogge, Cosmopolitanism and Sovereignty, 103 ETH-
ICS 48, 51 (1992).
105. Put another way, people so cooperating and benefiting thereby, have
the requisite “share in the constitution” for contractarian obligations. ARIS-
TOTLE, supra note 4.
106. POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 77, at 131. Beitz has subsequently lim-
ited the scope of this argument from the strong claim that such cooperation
makes necessary a global difference principle, to a more limited claim that
such relationships render such a principle feasible. Charles R. Beitz, Cosmo-
politan Ideals and National Sentiment, 80 J. PHIL. 591, 595 (1983). I am using
this argument in a similar restricted sense to address the contractarian objec-
tion to such a principle, and not to argue for the principle itself.
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plicability of justice theory, the same basic predicate is present
in both.107 If global economic relations establish the necessary
predicate for contractarian obligations, then there is no theo-
retical bar to international distributive obligations patterned
along Rawlsian principles—in fact, global social relations de-
mand such principles.108
2. An Emerging Communitarian Account of Global Justice?
These developments also allow us to begin to speak in im-
portant ways of limited degrees of community, or “spheres of
justice” to borrow Walzer’s phrase, with respect to different is-
sues, institutions, or sets of social relations within the global
social space. Thus we can speak of “limited global community”
as embracing that level of “community” necessary to support
relations of justice, even if it does not manifest that level of
community necessary to speak of “global community” in the
fullest communitarian sense.109 Although globalization is fun-
damentally changing global social relations, I am not arguing
that global community has emerged fully formed, with the
richness and force of national community.110 However, we can
107. See generally FRANK J. GARCIA, TRADE, INEQUALITY AND JUSTICE: TOWARD
A LIBERAL THEORY OF JUST TRADE (2003) (developing the argument that
transnational distributive justice resembles domestic distributive justice in
key parameters). Barry’s objection to the extension of justice as fairness obli-
gations to international society on the basis of the absence of such economic
relations can thus be seen as ‘pre-global.’ Brian Barry, Humanity and Justice in
Global Perspective, in NOMOS XXIV: ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW 219,
229–34 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
108. See ONORA O’NEILL, BOUNDS OF JUSTICE 121 (2000) (given the nature
of contemporary international economic relations, “[q]uestions of transna-
tional economic justice cannot now be ruled out of order”); Westphalian
World, supra note 26, at 706 (“It is therefore unjustifiable to ignore the global
basic structure in a moral theory of international law—to proceed either as if
societies are economically self-sufficient and distributionally autono-
mous . . . .”).
109. When Domingo speaks of “global community” he intends it in this
latter, totalizing, aspirational sense. DOMINGO, supra note 101, at 102–03.
110. Hurrell cautions that “whilst the idea of a global moral community is
not entirely illusory, the elements of deformity [in contemporary global so-
cial relations] provide good grounds for arguing that it is certainly fragile
and cannot bear too much weight.” Hurrell, supra note 65, at 46. Neverthe-
less, with Berman we can at least say “[t]hese ideas of space and community
[do] complicate the presumed naturalness of nation-state communities.”
Law and Globalization, supra note 54, at 516.
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say (with Hurrell) that “[s]hared and institutionally embedded
understandings as to what constitutes justice and injustice are
no longer confined within national communities. In examin-
ing the changing structure of international society we surely
are dealing with ‘an identifiable set of institutions whose im-
pact on the life chances of different individuals can be traced’
(quoting Miller).”111
These changes have begun to influence even communi-
tarian theorists. Recently, Miller has been willing to acknowl-
edge a collective responsibility to protect basic human rights
in response to grave injustice outside our borders.112 With re-
spect to our negative duty to refrain from rights violations,
Miller is at his most cosmopolitan: This duty admits of no spe-
cial preference for compatriots.  However, with respect to posi-
tive duties and resources, our responses can be weighted in
favor of compatriots under the majority of circumstances.113
Miller’s conception of a global response to injustice thus re-
mains inherently both nationalistic and static: We evaluate in-
justice with respect to the national communities responsible
for it, and we respond to it out of a sense of collective national
responsibility, presuming the pre-eminence of national com-
munities throughout.114
Even Walzer’s approach in Thick and Thin,115 in which he
tries to demonstrate a zone of overlap among different theo-
ries of justice at least with respect to grave injustices, misses a
111. Hurrell, supra note 65, at 43.
112. DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE 12–17
(2007) [hereinafter NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY]. At the transnational level,
Miller recognizes a negative duty to refrain from basic rights violations our-
selves and a positive duty to prevent rights violations by others; and a positive
duty to secure the basic rights of people we are responsible for (and we are
not, in a cosmopolitan sense, responsible for everyone), or when another has
failed in their responsibility toward these people. Id. at 44–47.
113. Id. at 48–49. The reason such weighing is justified has to do with the
basis for these duties, which for Miller remains the nation. “By virtue of iden-
tifying with compatriots, sharing their values, and receiving the benefits that
national communities provide, we are also involved in collective responsibil-
ity for the things that nations do.” Id. at 265. In many situations, our individ-
ual responsibility to our collective “at home” outweighs our collective re-
sponsibility to other collectives than our own.
114. Id. at 263–65.
115. MICHAEL WALZER, THICK AND THIN: MORAL ARGUMENT AT HOME AND
ABROAD (1994).
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critical conclusion implied by globalization: The zone of over-
lap is not static, and globalization itself intensifies the process
of convergence. There is now a dynamic process of emerging
consensus around shared understandings in a newly constitut-
ing global social space, something Walzer does not contem-
plate.
B. A New Justice Architecture for a New Social Reality
If one is willing to accept that globalization is leading in
some manner or degree to the emergence of a global commu-
nity of some kind, then the stage is set for an examination of
the nature of such a community or communities and the sub-
stance of a communitarian approach to global justice. How-
ever, this undertaking poses quite a complex set of questions.
If the central tenet of communitarianism is that justice flows
from community norms, practices, and understandings, then
what exactly are the norms, practices, and understandings of
the partial or limited communities I am positing here?
At least two basic approaches are possible. First, we might
find that insofar as there is a “partial” global community
around a specific set of issues and practices, it shares a clearly
identifiable set of robust normative commitments within its
scope, even if that scope is not comprehensive. Perhaps the
foremost example of this possibility is the global economy and
its regulatory framework.
A second alternative is something along the lines of
Walzer’s “thin” approach to global justice, covering only those
areas of overlap among normative communities, but in a new,
dynamic and evolutionary sense: The overlap is not coinciden-
tal, but constitutive of an emerging global consensus. This ap-
proach assumes that a communitarian theory of global justice
at this juncture will be truly global in scope, yet not be as com-
prehensive as a domestic theory of justice, since there is still no
comprehensive community at the global level.
1. The Global Economy, a Global Basic Structure, and Global
Justice
Given its evolution and contours, it seems relatively clear
that the global economy meets contractarian criteria for jus-
tice as a cooperative scheme for mutual benefit with socially
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produced goods and an allocative scheme.116 The global econ-
omy as a collective social enterprise has perhaps the most
widespread adherence of any such enterprise at the global
level to a set of shared traditions, practices, and understand-
ings—here, centered around markets, economic regulation,
and market society.
What are the normative commitments of this global eco-
nomic community? One often hears the view that the global
market reflects principles of economic liberalism, due to the
relationship between liberalism and markets, and the liberal
ideology of its core institutions and key actors.117 If this is so,
we might find that a liberal theory of economic justice such as
Justice as Fairness, generally considered a domestic theory of
justice within liberal States, might be sustainable with regard
to all participants—States and institutions alike—in the spe-
cialized partial global community of the global market.118 In
other words, we might find that a liberal theory of economic
justice is an appropriately pluralistic theory of global eco-
nomic justice for the global economic community. Because
the global economy is built on a market model and regulated
along liberal lines by global institutions, near-universal partici-
pation in this market and these institutions reflects, at least in
part, a consensus among participants that a liberal approach
116. POGGE, supra note 76, at 238–80; JONES, supra note 22, at 8; POLITICAL
THEORY, supra note 77, at 166–67; Westphalian World, supra note 26, at
705–06; Eskelinen, supra note 77, at 48.
117. Thus extending at a global level Polanyi’s Market Society argument.
See, e.g., KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (1944) (discussing the
triumph of liberalism in economic theory). Whether or not optimally per-
forming markets naturally reinforce liberal principles is a debate at least as
old as Adam Smith. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND
CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, ch. II (1778) (arguing that the eco-
nomic and political potential of the French-British relationship was best
served by freeing—not regulating—trade between the two rivals).
118. We might even find, in the end, that communitarian changes in
global social relations make cosmopolitanism sustainable bit by bit—a sort of
creeping cosmopolitanism—insofar as we see emerging pockets of liberal
community. In a related sense, Risse suggests that we already live on “a cos-
mopolitan plateau”—that cosmopolitanism has already won its most impor-
tant victory in establishing that moral equality is an essential part of any cred-
ible theory of global justice, whatever the disagreement about the implica-
tions of this view and its consequences for institutional structures. Mathias
Risse, Global Justice, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
(David Estlund ed., 2012).
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to socioeconomic organization is appropriate.119 Thus, for this
partial global community, justice would be robust even if its
scope was confined to economic relations among participants.
What might such justice look like?  While a full discussion
of such a conception of justice is outside the scope of this Arti-
cle, I suggest an international difference principle to guide in-
stitutions involved in allocating the outcomes of global cooper-
ative schemes, drawn directly from Rawls’s own domestic elab-
oration: International social and economic inequalities are just
only if they result in compensating benefits for all persons sub-
ject to them, and in particular for the least advantaged per-
sons.120 This would mean as a general matter that the institu-
tions of this partial community such as the WTO, the World
Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which
make significant allocative decisions involving the benefits and
burdens of global economic cooperation among participants,
must be guided by the difference principle in their institu-
tional decision-making.121
The global economy as a “specialized” community within
global social relations represents one possibility opened by
globalization: partial communities emerging around a special-
ized set of traditions, practices, and understandings and devel-
oping norms of justice for that community.  Such a community
is global in terms of membership but limited in terms of re-
sponsibilities.  Implicit in such an approach is a kind of “moral
federalism,” to borrow Wilfried Hinsch’s concept, a structure
within which different principles of justice do different but
complementary kinds of work at different levels within the sys-
119. Of course, when a market is truly global, participation reflects at
some level simply the recognition that there is no other game in town,
though the fact that abstention is possible (North Korea, for example), and
a high degree of volitional behavior among States (the long list of countries
queuing to join the WTO or the EU, for example), suggests that at some
point the distinction between motives loses meaning.
120. “[T]he second [principle] holds that social and economic inequali-
ties, for example inequalities of wealth and authority, are just only if they
result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least
advantaged members of society.” RAWLS, supra note 4, at 13.
121. Frank J. Garcia, Justice, the Bretton Woods Institutions and the Problem of
Inequality, in DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE WTO LEGAL SYSTEM 475, 486–87
(Chantal Thomas & Joel P. Trachtman eds., 2009).
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tem (in particular, the national and the transnational).122 On
this view, justice between members of the global economic
community might be along the lines of a robust global differ-
ence principle within their economic relationship, but differ-
ent among these same States when they act outside this partic-
ular economic community on other matters of shared interest.
2. A Global Basic Package: Building on a New Base
A second possibility involves a truly global community in
terms of both membership and scope, albeit with possibly
“shallower” sets of norms or commitments. Although it is not
possible to offer a definitive account of such a community and
its norms here, nevertheless I will offer some preliminary ob-
servations on its possible dimensions.123
a. Rethinking Boundaries and the Role of the State
The developments in globalization discussed here are
challenging and transforming traditional political and legal
concepts that have hitherto organized social relations at an in-
122. Wilfried Hinsch, Global Distributive Justice, 32 METAPHILOSOPHY 58, 59
(2001). For Hinsch, there is no reason in principle why domestic and trans-
national principles of distributive justice need to be identical.  Indeed, al-
lowing for divergent but compatible conceptions of justice may be more con-
sistent with the pluralist nature of global society, and with liberal values of
autonomy. Id. at 60. Thus, for example, the United States can pursue one
kind of distributive justice through its domestic social welfare and tax legisla-
tion, a different kind of distributive justice through WTO Special & Differen-
tial Treatment, and yet a third kind of distributive justice through USAID,
without there necessarily being a conflict. Or, to put it more precisely, the
simple fact of their difference does not by itself create a justice problem—
the question is whether in each case the principle of justice is the appropri-
ate one and the implementation adequate.  On the possibility of plural ap-
proaches to global justice, see generally GARCIA, supra note 31(applying the
three approaches to Rawlsian liberalism, communitarianism, and consent
theory to global justice).
123. A complete account of the extent of such shared global norms, prac-
tices, and understandings would require combining traditional domestic po-
litical theory with the many innovative ongoing studies of our new global
social and legal reality, and constitute nothing short of a legal anthropology
of global justice. Interesting and promising beginnings of such an account
include SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO
GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006); DOMINGO, supra note 101; PAUL SCHIFF
BERMAN, GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM: A JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW BEYOND BOR-
DERS (2012) [hereinafter GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM].
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ternational level—in particular, the role of States and the na-
ture of boundaries.124 Historically, the dominant view of the
role of the State in international relations has been as a sover-
eign actor acting in its unitary self-interest.125 Beginning with
the post-War human rights movement and intensifying
through globalization, social processes and, increasingly, regu-
lation are occurring on a transboundary networked basis.
These dynamics have been challenging and transforming this
understanding of the State as actor on the international stage,
to the State as agent in the sense of one who acts on behalf of
another, in an increasingly rich multipolar and networked en-
vironment.126 That “other” consists of the range of individuals,
groups, and national communities that States represent on the
international level.127
These changes have implications throughout domestic
and international politics and social relations as they have
been conventionally understood.128 Because of globalization,
the very notion of what is “national” and what is “interna-
tional” or “global” is undergoing a change, as even “national”
institutions can now be sometimes understood more accu-
rately as horizontally integrated components of a transnational
124. See, e.g., DOMINGO, supra note 101, at 55–57 (noting the globalization
of social relations forcing a globalization of law). See generally KENICHI
OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL ECONOMIES
(1995) (arguing that the state is an inefficient unit of organization in a
globalized environment). But see Hopkins, supra note 12, at 19 (and sources
cited therein) (globalization is itself the product of nation States and can
flourish only if nation States remain strong).
125. See POLITICAL THEORY, supra note 77, at 3, 35–50 (critiquing the domi-
nant, Hobbesian view of the State in international relations).
126. Indeed, insofar as the new global rulemaking transcends the State,
the questions of agency and accountability extend beyond the State as well,
to the accountability of a new global administrative process. See Joshua Co-
hen & Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 763,
765–66 (2005) (noting shift in accountability models necessitated by emer-
gence of global politics).
127. Hurrell, supra note 65, at 41. Or, depending on one’s view, that
“other” is the transnational capitalist class. See B.S. Chimni, International Insti-
tutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making, 15 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 1, 4
(2004).
128. See, e.g., Cohen & Sabel, supra note 126, at 763 (“ . . . something new
is happening politically beyond the borders of individual states and irreduci-
ble to their voluntary interactions.  To distinguish these developments from
what is commonly called ‘international law and politics,’ we use the term
‘global politics.’).
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system, than as vertically accountable components of a tradi-
tional “State.”129 Globalization emphasizes the arbitrariness of
many contemporary territorially-based allocative principles
such as citizenship, because it allows us to be aware of the
plight of others as never before, forcing us to ask whether the
traditional way of allocating rights, opportunities, and re-
sources is really adequate in a globalizing world.130
If global community is possible and emerging, as I have
argued, then we have to rethink the discretion given to States
to use boundaries as primary determinants of global justice.131
We need to develop a model for the international delivery of
justice—a conception of effective global citizenship—in which
the accident of birthplace, or the vagaries of naturalization
law, do not fundamentally affect each person’s life pros-
pects.132 Particularly insofar as globalization involves the
global spread of market society, each person’s access to basic
social rights becomes more important, as they increasingly
face the local disruptive effects of market society while living
129. See Saskia Sassen, The State and Economic Globalization: Any Implications
for International Law?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L.109, 110 (2000) (“. . . the [transna-
tional] system also lies, to a far higher degree than is usually recognized,
inside particular components of national states.”).
130. See Thomas W. Pogge, An Egalitarian Law of Peoples, 23 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 195 (1993) (borders have tremendous distributive impact which re-
quires justification); Cohen & Sabel, supra note 126, at 795 (“The emergence
of global rulemaking, with direct consequences for individuals and firms as
well as States of course, puts pressure on existing national arrangements,
unsettles the delicate compromises of decades past, and requires national
actors to justify what were once sovereign choices to a world of foreigners.”).
131. As things stand, there is a pernicious anomaly: free movement of cap-
ital but no free movement of persons, which could be seen as a deliberate
attempt to keep labor costs from equalizing. A global economic space de-
mands something approaching the free movement of persons, subject to
some notion of carrying capacity or assimilation rate. The very idea conjures
images of unsupportable mass migrations, which are not inevitable, nor are
they the necessary result of changes in border policies. The primary reason
for such shifts would be economic inequality, a subject that poses a central
challenge to global public law.
132. See, e.g., Barbara Arneil, Global Citizenship and Empire, 11 CITIZENSHIP
STUD. 301 (2007) (proposing an alternative view of global citizenship based
on our shared fate and on the protection of basic social rights). But see NA-
TIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 112, at 167 (distinguishing any minimum
set of ‘global’ rights from citizenship, and reserving the latter for national
political communities).
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under territorial units increasingly unable to effectively ame-
liorate these effects on their own.133
This does not, however, mean that global institutions
must be modeled on domestic institutions to form a world
State. Rather, we must see that, in normative terms, global in-
stitutions must be justifiable according to the same principles
we apply in domestic political theory. The legitimacy of global
institutions can no longer rest entirely on their creation by
States along duly authorized treaty lines, but will require some
increased form of public participation, reflecting normative
principles of political theory in the same way that domestic in-
stitutions must.134
Global community demands a new view of the role of the
State, in which the State no longer holds a monopoly on the
delivery of basic public goods, but rather, as the guarantor of
last resort, plays a central role in their delivery.135 It is increas-
ingly common to understand the State as co-existent with a
variety of cross-border networks.136 Indeed it has been argued
that one key shift in the role of the State in globalization is as
133. This can be conceived as a global version of the welfare net that ad-
vanced economies offer their members as a means to soften the rigors of
market society and minimize the adverse political consequences of job turn-
over. To the extent that globalization involves creation of a global market
society, it points to the gap in this welfare net at the global level. Mandle &
Ferleger, supra note 10, at 14. One way to address the ethical consequences
of global market society, and the social disruption it causes, is to establish
the kinds of compensation mechanisms that have long been recognized as
essential in domestic economies. Id. at 15.
134. See LEA BRILMAYER, JUSTIFYING INTERNATIONAL ACTS (1989) (compar-
ing international ethics and domestic political theory).
135. See Saskia Sassen, The State and Globalization: Denationalized Participa-
tion, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1141, 1150–58 (2004) (States are engaging globaliza-
tion as offering new ways to deliver basic public goods such as law through
what she terms “legalities”—statutes, regulations, other legislative output,
court decisions, etc.—in ways that are neither exclusively “global” nor exclu-
sively “national”). On the changing role of the State and its relationship to
both law and power, see generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, Filling Power Vacu-
ums in the New Global Legal Order, 54 B.C. L. REV. 919 (2013).
136. Law and Globalization, supra note 54, at 500–07. On the subject of
networks in general, the place to begin is ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW
WORLD ORDER (2004) (analyzing the emergence of new kinds of regulatory
partnerships not necessarily mediated through the State, such as those
among financial regulators, police, judges, insurance regulators, even legisla-
tors).
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manager of these networks.137 In governance terms, networks
do have their darker side, involving risks to transparency and
accountability.138 States retain a fundamental backstop role in
protecting us from these risks while they maximize opportuni-
ties for us as our agents.
This implies, among other things, that a State’s legitimacy
will increasingly depend on its ability to successfully deliver so-
cial goods to the people and groups it represents by managing,
not resisting, emerging transboundary networks.139 When a
State exercises such agency, it is increasingly to be guided by
emerging notions of an international public good.140 All of
this is profoundly changing our understanding of boundaries:
They are to be managed by the State for the good of the indi-
viduals and groups it represents, according to some emerging
notion of the global public good.
b. Global Public Law
This notion of the global public good has fundamental
implications for international law and its role and makes it
possible to ask what sorts of rights and institutional structures
can be said to exist in this transboundary space. This will re-
quire a profound re-examination of core international legal
doctrines and institutions such as boundaries, sovereignty, le-
gitimacy, citizenship, and the territorial control of re-
sources.141 If a global community or a global basic structure
with some notion of global public good is emerging, at least in
a limited form, then it needs something like a global public
137. Manuel Castells has argued that globalization is bringing about a new
form of nation-State, the “network State,” whose principle duty is to success-
fully manage on our behalf this web of networks. Manuel Castells, The Net-
work Society: From Knowledge to Policy, in THE NETWORK SOCIETY: FROM KNOWL-
EDGE TO POLICY 15, 15–16 (Manuel Castells & Gustavo Cardoso eds., 2005).
138. Law and Globalization, supra note 54, at 502–03.
139. Castells, supra note 137.
140. Id.
141. Other doctrines that must be reexamined from the perspective of
global justice include the basic notion of territorial sovereignty as a virtually
unlimited right over resources and the combination of soft human rights
and hard rules of economic deregulation and competition. See THOMAS
POGGE, WORLD POVERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: COSMOPOLITAN RESPONSIBILI-
TIES AND REFORMS 147–48 (2002).
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law for its structure.142 Globalization is fundamentally trans-
forming international law from the public law of inter-state re-
lations to the public law of a global community.143 This change
works in both directions, as international law is itself a force
facilitating regulatory globalization and the interconnection of
disparate legal communities.144 Such a shift at the global level
resembles the emergence at the regional level of a “European”
law and a “European” economic community out of the many
disparate States involved in the European integration process;
a new legal order both facilitates, and emerges out of, a recon-
stituted (and constitutive) set of socioeconomic and political
relationships.145
What can we say about the content of such a global public
law?  Answering this question will require much work, along
the lines of a comparative study of public law.146 Here I can
142. Global public law can be conceptualized as the organization of the
structure of powers, duties, and limits of meta-state governance and its of-
ficers; relations of the meta-state levels of governance (International Organi-
zations) to the midrange (States) and to individuals; and the definition and
exercise of powers of meta-state governance for the public good. Alterna-
tively, one can think of it as the regulatory system for delivery of global pub-
lic goods. See generally PROVIDING GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: MANAGING GLOBAL-
IZATION (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 2003) (providing a series of analyses to create
a fuller understanding of the provision of public goods).
143. See DOMINGO, supra note 101, at 121 (“Global law. . .does not yet con-
stitute a legal order in the strictest sense, but it is called to become one.”);
GIULIANA ZICCARDI CAPALDO, THE PILLARS OF GLOBAL LAW, at xvii (2008)
(“[T]oday’s international legal order is developing into a truly global system
of law.”). See generally Benedict Kingsbury, International Law as Inter-Public
Law, in MORAL UNIVERSALISM AND PLURALISM 167 (Henry S. Richardson &
Melissa Williams eds., 2009) (arguing that international law should be theo-
rized as the law between public entities outside of the state); Law and Global-
ization, supra note 54 (emphasizing law and globalization, rather than tradi-
tional international law).
144. Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155,
1157–58 (2007).
145. Indeed, Hurrell cites the European Union’s evolving acquis as an ex-
ample of the sort of shared community-building understandings that trans-
national institutions can build. Hurrell, supra note 65, at 43. The founda-
tional treatment of this is of course J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Eu-
rope, 100 YALE L.J. 2403 (1991). For a recent overview of this process that
emphasizes the role of legal institutions, see Vlad Perju, Reason and Authority
in the European Court of Justice, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 307 (2009).
146. Benedict Kingsbury’s global administrative law project has, of course,
been central to this kind of development. See, e.g., BENEDICT KINGSBURY,
NICO KRISCH & RICHARD B. STEWART, THE EMERGENCE OF GLOBAL ADMINIS-
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suggest that if we begin with the traditional functions of public
law, we can see that a global public law will set out the basic
governance structure of this new space. This may mean new
institutions, or it may simply mean new roles and levels of co-
ordination among institutions. However the scope of the pro-
ject is defined, it will mean reflection along fundamental pub-
lic law lines concerning the shape of this emerging new order.
The tasks of a new global public law will include the regu-
lation of the global economic space.147 The burgeoning litera-
tures on the constitutionalization of international economic
law,148 the fragmentation of the international legal regime,149
the social responsibility of corporate actors,150 and the effect
of investment treaties on social welfare,151 to take but a few
examples, constitute the deepest contemporary exploration of
a global public law in its economic regulatory dimension. The
key paradigm shift is to recognize that these literatures are not
simply scholarly reflection on existing problems within ex-
isting disciplines; they are, if not the disaggregated constitu-
tional convention of this new global public order, then at least
its Federalist Papers.152
TRATIVE LAW (2005) (outlining Kingsbury’s work); see also Alfred Aman,
Globalization, Democracy and the Need for a New Administrative Law, 10 INDIANA J.
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 125 (2003) (arguing that a new global administrative law
should fill some of the gaps created by globalization).
147. The current model of inter-State cooperation (such as the OECD ap-
proach to global competition law) is inadequate. Tita, supra note 83, at 50.
148. See, e.g., ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
IN THE 21ST CENTURY: CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM AND MULTILEVEL GOVERN-
ANCE OF INTERDEPENDENT PUBLIC GOODS (2012); RULING THE WORLD, supra
note 74.
149. See, e.g., REGIME INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAG-
MENTATION (Margaret Young ed., 2012); JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF
NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2009).
150. See, e.g., JOHN RUGGIE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, PROTECT, RESPECT AND
REMEDY: A FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2008).
151. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND ARBI-
TRATION (Pierre Dupuy et al. eds., 2009); Julie Maupin, Public and Private in
International Investment Law: An Integrated Systems Approach, 54 VA. J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144019.
152. See RULING THE WORLD, supra note 74, at 3 (“As a historical matter,
constitutional discourse has predominantly—but not exclusively—occurred
in the domestic setting. However . . . recent years have witnessed an intensifi-
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Global public law must also include regulation of basic so-
cial welfare issues at the global level. In my view, the dynamics
analyzed here with respect to emerging globally shared under-
standings about market society and its regulatory framework
also justify a global approach to human social welfare.  Draw-
ing on the work of Walzer, Miller, and Dirk Messner regarding
what Messner calls a “global minimal ethics,”153 a global con-
sensus has emerged that every human being has a right to have
his or her vital interests met, regardless of nationality or citi-
zenship, through the allocative local and global institutions
that affect his or her particular life prospects.
c. The “Global Basic Package”
This allocation of resources may be discussed through ref-
erence to terms of a “basic package” that encompass the core
necessities for human life. I call this minimum core the
“Global Basic Package”: a basic bundle of political, social, and
economic rights, safeguarded through global law and deliv-
ered in a partnership between global and national institutions,
in much the same way that political, social, and economic
rights are safeguarded by federal law and delivered through a
variety of federal/State partnerships in the United States.154
This list can be drawn in a variety of ways—I suggest that
at a minimum, the Global Basic Package as it is emerging con-
sists of the following four elements: security, subsistence, lib-
erty, and voice.155 These are widely recognized in human
cation of constitutional discourse in many sites of transnational govern-
ance.”).
153. Walzer, supra note 17, at 1–19; NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note
112; Messner, supra note 63, at 33. Here I am thinking in more general
terms, along the lines of what sorts of norms, albeit ‘thinner’ ones, could
reflect the broadest possible support from a limited ‘global’ community. A
particular, deeper, ‘sub-community’ of globalization, such as the global mar-
ket, might be able to support a ‘thicker’ set of norms, as suggested above.
154. This substantive approach complements but differs from a more pro-
cedural approach such as Berman’s collection of tools for managing a global
legal pluralism. See GLOBAL LEGAL PLURALISM, supra note 123, at 152–90.
155. Charles Jones offers three core values: subsistence, liberty, and physi-
cal security. See generally JONES, supra note 22. Brian Barry adds to this a list of
“vital interests” such as clean drinking water, sanitation, clothing, shelter,
medical care, and primary education. Brian Barry, International Society from a
Cosmopolitan Perspective, in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 144, 148 (David R. Mapel
& Terry Nardin eds., 1998); see also Global Justice, supra note 18, at 450 (“natu-
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rights instruments and multilateral treaties of various kinds,156
are supported across the full range of normative theory,157 and
are implemented (to varying degrees, of course) throughout
global and domestic political relations by States, civil society,
and other institutions.158
rally, these basic rights include a few socioeconomic human rights, including
the right to subsistence and good health”). Importantly, Deacon adds politi-
cal participation to this list. BOB DEACON, GLOBAL SOCIAL POLICY & GOVERN-
ANCE 136 (2007); see also Chimni, supra note 127, at 3. More recently, Rafael
Domingo has placed dignity, liberty, and equality (including addressing eco-
nomic inequalities) at the center of global law. DOMINGO, supra note 101, at
139–42. Similarly, Andrew Hurrell cites emerging norms around safeguard-
ing peace and security, managing common challenges (such as the environ-
ment or the global economy), and promoting common values (such as self-
determination, human rights, and democracy). Hurrell, supra note 65, at 41.
156. See generally RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW (Sarah Joseph & Adam McBeth eds., 2010) (surveying a range of
human rights instruments, fora, and policy issues). There is, moreover, evi-
dence of the interpenetration of the human rights regime into hitherto frag-
mented regimes such as international economic law, a critical development
in an integrated approach to protecting basic rights. KINLEY, supra note 16
(integrating human rights, economic law, and globalization); Holger Hes-
termeyer, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the World Trade Organization:
Legal Aspects and Reality, in ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS: CON-
TEMPORARY ISSUES AND CHALLENGES (E. Riedel et al. eds., 2014) (forthcom-
ing) (noting complex but evolving interaction between these regimes).
157. See, e.g., Sen, supra note 14, at 172 (arguing that enough grounds
exist in the major normative traditions to more than adequately compel ac-
tion to address grave injustice); David R. Mapel, Justice Diversity and Law in
International Society, in INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY: DIVERSE ETHICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES, supra note 3, at 247 (The world’s leading religious and philosophical
traditions can be said to converge around the triad of human rights, democ-
racy and distributive justice.). These different traditions offer, of course, va-
rying degrees of support for different elements of this consensus, but the net
overall effect is strikingly consistent. Drawing on Scanlon, Sebastiano Maf-
fetone suggests that the “urgency” of core human needs (subsistence and
security in particular) requires and permits global action independently of
theoretical arguments as to the justifiability of such action under different
rubrics. Global Justice, supra note 18, at 449–52.
158. See, e.g., RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LAW, supra note 156 (reviewing a range of implementation models and path-
ways). Katherine Young has recently suggested an entirely new and emerg-
ing conversation around economic and social rights that transcends the
traditional divide between such rights and civil and political rights, and
unites all of them in an evolving and pluralist framework of implementation
through many levels and actors. KATHERINE YOUNG, CONSTITUTING ECO-
NOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 1–2  (2012).
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Nevertheless, there continue to be what Hurrell charac-
terizes as “deformities” in the global legal framework.159  Most
glaringly, there is uneven support for democratic voice at the
State and transnational levels, implying consequent problems
of legitimacy;160 and, we still lack an effective mechanism for
global wealth transfers at the scale necessary to support the
Global Basic Package.161 Jay Mandle and Louis Ferleger refer
to these deformities as the absence of mechanisms of control
and compensation, both necessary for the regulation of a
global market society.162 These limitations reflect the emer-
gent nature of any consensus on a global community of justice,
even at the partial or limited levels posited here.
In order to take the next step, global public law needs to
tackle distributive and legitimacy issues both between and
within States. The non-globalization view of international law
traditionally put the question of justice outside the realm of
international law. Globalization makes inequality and legiti-
macy central problems of global social relations—and there-
fore central problems for international law—in the same way
they are central problems of justice at the domestic level.
159. Hurrell, supra note 65, at 43 (listing problems of distributive fairness,
governance, postcolonialism, and the international rule of law).
160. Chimni notes “strong resistance from powerful States to put in place
a transparent and democratic decision-making process.” Chimni, supra note
127, at 3. On the general problem of protecting and deepening democratic
participation in a globalizing framework, see Armin von Bogdandy, Globaliza-
tion and Europe: How to Square Democracy, Globalization and International Law,
15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 885 (2004) (providing an overview of different European
theories regarding democracy and statehood in globalization and their inter-
action).
161. Hurrell attributes this to the unresolved tensions between globalist
norms and statist enforcement models: We still need to rely on effective
State power to manage economic crises and effect global wealth transfers—
hence, their underdevelopment at the global level. Hurrell, supra note 65, at
44.
162. Jay R. Mandle & Louis Ferleger, Dimensions of Globalization, Preface,
570 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 8, 16 (2000). Interestingly, Chimni
also sees the two as linked: The more democratic the system, the greater
would be the pressure for wealth redistribution, as those facing massive ine-
qualities far outnumber those more fortunate (or powerful)—hence their
underdevelopment. Chimni, supra note 127, at 3.
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IV. CONCLUSION: GLOBALIZATION AND THE PACE OF HISTORY
Thus far, I have not commented on the role of shared
history in forming communities of justice. Communitarians
like Walzer and Miller cite “time” and “historical continuity” as
key ingredients in the formation of community out of a hodge-
podge of shared experiences and cooperative activities, the
raw material of mutual self-interest.163 One objection to the
claim that the changes discussed above are forming some kind
of global community is simply that it may take more time: At
the global level, even granting the changes I have suggested
above, there has simply been too little shared history for these
changes to ripen into communitarian-style solidarity.164
One effect of globalization’s transformation of time and
space may be to change the role of time in the creation of
community, making global community possible at a relatively
fast pace. Time or history may be necessary ingredients for
community in part because a period of time has generally
been considered necessary for social contact and social knowl-
edge to attain the sort of cumulative intensity necessary for the
creation of more intimate bonds. Because of globalization, it
may well be that the process of building intense social bonds
can occur at a much faster rate, meaning that a common life
might be shaped more rapidly during periods of globalization
than otherwise thought possible. Therefore, it may be quite
possible to see global community emerge in a matter of de-
cades.165
Another consequence may be that globalization narratives
themselves function as the sort of constitutive myth, which his-
torians cite as essential in actually creating the identity these
myths already assert. As Miller points out in his discussion of
nationality, the very concept of nationality in the operative
sense depends upon a “myth” of shared history, often masking
163. SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note 17, at 48; MILLER, supra note 19, at
23–24.
164. There has been plenty of history (colonialism comes to mind) but
little of it “shared” in the sense communitarians mean.
165. We find a hint of this changing nature of the pace of change itself in
Walzer’s comparison of the fall of communism with the “fall” of medieval
Christendom: The time span of the former is much shorter than that of the
latter, “as befits the rhythms of modernity.” SPHERES OF JUSTICE, supra note
17, at 47. I am suggesting, in this sense, that the rhythms of globalization
may be even faster.
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actual social processes of domination and conquest.166 This in-
vention of a “communal national past” is an essential element
in the formation of a national identity and becomes part of the
identity itself once established.167
Using the literature of imagined communities,168 Berman
argues that the very fact that our national community “identi-
ties” have been constructed suggests that changes in global so-
cial relations can, in the same way, lead to new imagined com-
munities at the meta-state or global level.169 The many diver-
gent globalization narratives at work in the present historical
moment can play a vital role in creating a globalized world as a
matter of identity. The globalization debate itself—even the
contestation of globalization—reinforces the subjective forma-
tion of a globalized identity sharing many of the same features
of national identity already discussed: We discover ourselves to
be together in an ineluctable social-historical process, in which
our interests are bound up with each other’s interests.170
166. Ethical Significance of Nationality, supra note 17, at 654–55 (emphasis
added). The mythological aspect of national histories is one basis for ob-
jecting to nationalism as justified partiality. JONES, supra note 22, at 159–60.
Here I would like to accept for the time being this mythological aspect of
historical narratives (as Miller does for nationalist narratives) and explore its
relation to globalization narratives.
167. MILLER, supra note 19, at 122–23 (citing ANTHONY DAVID SMITH, THE
ETHNIC ORIGIN OF NATIONS 42 (1986)); see also Law and Globalization, supra
note 54, at 516 n.123 (citing ERNEST GELLNER, THOUGHT AND CHANGE 168
(1964) (“nationalism is not ‘the awakening of nations to self-consciousness:’
it invents nations where they do not exist . . . .”)).
168. See, e.g., BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS
ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6 (1991) (nation-states are
“imagined communities” because “the members of even the smallest nation
will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of
them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”).
169. See Law and Globalization, supra note 54, at 516–18 (discussing states as
“imagined communities” and the shift through globalization to community
“imagined” at the global level).
170. See Cohen & Sabel, supra note 126, at 796 (suggesting that the emer-
gence of global politics, global rulemaking, and a global public sphere could
create among dispersed peoples “a new identity as common members of an
organized global populace” whose “fates as human beings would—despite
our cultural and linguistic differences—be deeply and self-consciously
shaped by mutually accountable rulemaking that depends on local debate, is
informed by global comparisons, and works in a space of public reasons”).
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Moreover, as an identity this new form of inclusion would
continue to distinguish us from “Others.”171 However, and this
is the crucial difference, because social membership in a
global community is by nature comprehensive,172 the “Other”
we would be distinguishing from in globalization narratives is
not the Other of a rival contemporary political community,
but the Other of a pre-global past. In other words, our identity
would no longer be based solely on nation versus nation, but
on global versus pre-global.173 Viewed in this light, the present
debate over the possibility of global justice itself reflects the
development of a new global identity, and a communal pro-
cess of deliberation over possible shared understandings and
shared institutions, which are themselves both evidence of and
constitutive of such community.
In this sense, we find ourselves at a historic moment in the
emergence of a consensus over global justice. This moment
has been actively building for the past half-century at least, and
has been foreseen even earlier by thinkers as diverse as Hume
and Kant. A quarter of a millennium ago Hume wrote that if
we “suppose that several distinct societies maintain a kind of
intercourse for mutual convenience and advantage, the
boundaries of justice still grow larger, in proportion to the
largeness of men’s views, and the force of their mutual con-
nections.”174 Because of globalization the connections have
never been more forceful. Indeed, almost as long ago Kant
made what may be the first globalization argument when he
argued for the universal right of decent treatment for all per-
sons on the basis of the curved nature of the planet’s surface:
“Since it is a globe, they cannot disperse indefinitely, but must
171. See Law and Globalization, supra note 54, at 500.
172. I am speaking here in a structural sense—as I mentioned above, I
recognize that globalization currently marginalizes certain people and popu-
lations, which is part of the equity problem in contemporary globalization
that must be addressed.
173. See JENS BARTELSON, VISIONS OF WORLD COMMUNITY (2009) (arguing
that nationalist thinkers have trapped the idea of community into bounded
national polities, but that history suggests an alternative vision that allows for
a world community based on a diversity of views within a shared planetary
space).
174. DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS 26
(J.B. Schneewind ed., Hackett Publishing Co., 1966) (1777).
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tolerate each other.”175 Kant could not have foreseen, but
would recognize, how globalization has dramatically tightened
the curve of this space into a single point within which all per-
sons are present, bringing us into deeper sustained contact
with each other than the mere surface of the planet ever
could. We have, in a sense, cut right through the heart of the
globe.
We must recall, however, that the progression toward
globalization is not inevitable or linear,176 nor is the achieve-
ment of a just globalization. Its evolution will be incremental
and will involve work at the theoretical, doctrinal, political,
and institutional levels. Recalling Hume, the “largeness” of
people’s views is central to the community of globalization, and
it is the largeness of our views, and our own recognition of
their scale, that this Article has sought to both chronicle and
foster. Continuing the work of “thickening” this model of
global justice in economic and non-economic matters is a task
for all of us.
175. Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT 446
(Carl J. Friedrich ed., The Modern Library, 1977) (1795).
176. Hopkins, supra note 12, at 36.
